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The Constitution on the Campus
Charles Alan Wright*
Thi§ article is the text of the Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures,
delivered by Professor Wright at the Vanderbilt University School
of Law in April, 1969. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., left a largepart
of his estate to the UnitedStates at his death in 1935. By Act of Congress in 1955, the disposition of the property was entrusted to a
Permanent Committee, which, among other projects, sponsors the
,annualHohnes Lectures by a distinguishedlegal scholar.
Professor Wright has brought to this topic both profound constitutional scholarship and wide experience in dealing with related
problems at his university. His thesis is that the Constitution is and
should be applicableto the college campus. Subject to reasonableand
nondiscriminatoryregulations, the first amendment applies with full
vigor to student expression. The student is protected by the due
process clause in disciplinaryproceedings, but the courts will recognize as being within due process any institutionalprocedure which is
fair and reasonable and which reliably determines the issues.Professor Wright concludes with a discussion of what these developments
mean to the modern university.
I.

THE CONSTITUTION COMES

To

THE CAMPUS

Law, by its very nature, tends to change and to grow very slowly.

Continuity is an important element of the common-law tradition;
development, in any branch of law, is likely to be achieved by one

small step after another. Even a seemingly epochal decision. such as
Brown v. Board of Education,' is rarely a surprise to those who have
kept a close eye on the omens and who have watched the steady
development of a doctrine that ultimately comes into full fruition.
*

Charles T. McCormick Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law; Visiting

Professor, 1968-69, Yale Law School; author of textbook on Federal Courts. The author is indebted to Michael S. Jacobs, a student at the Yale Law School, for valuable assistance in the pre-

paration of these lectures.
I. 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
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Former Justice Tom Clark has only recently pointed out the logical, indeed inevitable, development that led from Griffin v. Illinois,2 where it
was held that an indigent defendant must be given a free copy of the
transcript of his trial, to Miranda v. Arizona3 laying down a set of
rules on the warnings the police must give to arrested persons.' It is
quite exceptional when one can point to a particular moment in time
and say that there the law turned 180 degrees. Because a sudden aboutface in the law is exceptional, it is also of particular interest. My
subject in these lectures, the extent to which university students are
protected by the Bill of Rights and the requirements of due process, is
one of these rare instances.
On September 22, 1959, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit decided the obscure case of Steier v. New York State
Education Commissioner.5 Arthur Steier was a student at Brooklyn
College who thought that the college was dominating student
organizations. He said so in two letters to the president of the college
that were obviously bitter but were quite mild indeed by the standards
of campus rhetoric to which we recently have become accustomed.
Because of these letters he was suspended from college under a vague
rule requiring students to "conform to the requirements of good
manners and good morals." Six months later a chastened and
penitent Steier was readmitted on probation, after he had agreed to
abide by the rules and "generally have a change of spirit." When he
subsequently caused to be published in the college newspaper the story
of his probation the authorities concluded that his change of spirit
had not been sufficient and this time he was expelled.
Steier considered that he had been unjustly treated and thought
that he had a grievance under the Constitution of the United States.
He went to court to press that grievance, but the Second Circuit
agreed with the district court that he was entitled to no relief. There
were two opinions for the majority in the Steier case. In one of the
opinions Steier was told that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction of
claims such as his.
Education is a field of life reserved to the individual states. The only restriction
the Federal Government imposes is that in their educational program no state
may discriminate against an individual because of race, color or creed.'
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

351 U.S. 12 (1956).
384 U.S. 436 (1965).
Clark, Book Review, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 239, 244 (1968).
271 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1959).
Id. at 18.
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The other judge in the majority thought that the federal courts had
jurisdiction but that no constitutional right of Steier's had been
denied. Steier was indeed constitutionally free, on this view, to say
what he pleased, but he was not free to say it as a student at
Brooklyn College. He had been admitted to Brooklyn College "not as
a matter of right but as a matter of grace after having agreed to
conform to its rules and regulations." 7
The majority in the Steier case were undoubtedly right-in terms
of the law as it then stood. The highest court in the land had spoken
of attendance at a state university as a mere "privilege," 8 and the
decisions were virtually uniform that a student could be expelled for
whatever reason and by whatever procedure the university authorities
thought proper. The deviations from this usual view were so few that
they tended to reinforce the authority of the permissive precedents.
There was, indeed, an 1887 decision from the Court of Common
Pleas in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, recently much admired,
that pointed in a different direction Other courts, in dicta, had cautioned educational institutions not to be arbitrary or capricious, and
one well-known Tennessee decision had suggested procedures it would
be desirable to follow, 0 but dicta it all was. So far as can be found, at
the time of the Steier decision no court had ordered reinstatement for
a student expelled or suspended from college."
Occasionally, very occasionally, a voice could be heard in the
wilderness challenging the old orthodoxy. The most notable was that
of Professor Warren Seavey, who, in 1957, said:
our sense of justice should be outraged by denial to students of the normal
safeguards. It is shocking that the officials of a state educational institution,
which can function properly only if our freedoms are preserved, should not
understand the elementary principles of fair play. It is equally shocking to find
that a court supports them in denying to a student the protection given to a
12
pickpocket.

Doubtless the answer to this by the supporters of the old order would
have been that they were, indeed, paragons of fair play, that they
leaned over backwards to give the student every possible doubt and
7.
8.

Id. at 20.
Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California, 293 U.S. 245, 261 (1934).

9.

Commonwealth ex rel. Hill v. McCauley, 3 Pa. C.C. Rep. 77 (C.P. Cumberland Cy.

1887).
10.

II.

State ex rel.
Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W. 2d 822'(1942).
Byse, Procedure in Student Dismissal Proceedings: Law and Policy,

COLLEGE STUDENT PERSONNEL,

12.

JOURNAL OF

March 1963, at 131-36.

Seavey, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process." 70 HARV. L. REV. 1406 (1957).
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to act only in his best interest, but that it was no business of the
courts to look into these matters to see just how fair the universities had
actually been. To support their position, the administrators could draw
on a whole grab-bag of conceptualisms: that attendance at the university
was a privilege rather than a right; that the university stood in loco
parentis to the student; or that the vague rules, so commonly found in
university catalogues, that a student could be dismissed whenever the
institution thought this advisable, constituted a contract that the
student had accejted.
In retrospect the surprising thing is not that Steier lost his case,
but that he lost it to a divided court. My former boss and dear friend,
the late Chief Judge Charles E. Clark, dissented from the dismissal of
Steier's action. In a memorable opinion he argued that Steier's
conduct had called for patient response rather than discipline and
expulsion. And he rejected the view that
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution is a paltry piece of
class legislation limited, it seems, to according protection to Negroes in the
South and Jehovah's Witnesses in other 3 areas. Surely the noble privileges therein
embodied are not to be thus denigrated.1

The dissent was eloquent-but it was a dissent only. Steier remained
expelled. But the victory for institutional autonomy that the Steier
decision represented-if indeed it was a victory-was the final gasp of
a dying order.
Five months after the Second Circuit refused relief to Steier, and
two days after the Supreme Court declined to hear his case," a group
of students from Alabama State College for Negroes conducted a sitin when they were refused service in the lunchroom of the county
courthouse in Montgomery. In the next few days some or all of these
students participated in mass marches and engaged in hymn singing
and speech making on the steps of the State Capitol. On March 4th
nine students were notified that the State Board of Education had
ordered their expulsion because of "this problem of Alabama State
College." Twenty other students were placed on probation. The
students were given no hearing. Indeed they were never specifically
advised of the ground for disciplining them, although it appears that
it was intended to rest on a catalogue regulation providing for
expulsion for "conduct prejudicial to the school and for conduct
unbecoming a student or future teacher in schools of Alabama, for
13.

271 F.2d at 23.

14. Steier v. New York State Education Commission, 361 U.S. 966 (1960).
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insubordination and insurrection, or for inciting other pupils to like
conduct."
These students, like Steier, went to court to challenge their
expulsion and, like Steier, they were unsuccessful in the district court.
So courageous and innovative a judge as Frank M. Johnson, Jr., could
find no escape from the force of the precedents and felt obliged to
hold that "the right to attend a public college or university is not in
and of itself a constitutional right.' ' ' 5 Accordingly there was no
constitutional barrier to expulsion without notice and hearing. From
there the case went to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and,
on August 4, 1961, the law on this question turned 180 degrees, when
the opinion was handed down in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of
Education.6
The path-breaking opinion for the Court was by one of the great
judges-and great men-of our times, Richard T. Rives, and was
joined in by an outstanding colleague, Judge John Minor Wisdom.
The fundamental principle on which Dixon rests is that
"whenever a governmental body acts so as to injure an individual, the
Constitution requires that the act be consonant with due process of
law.""7 Judge Rives thought that even if attending a public university
is only a "privilege," rather than a right, "it nonetheless remains true
that the State cannot condition the grapting of even a privilege upon
the renunciation of the constitutional right to procedural due
process.' ' 8 Language in the regulations of the Board of Education
allowing expulsion of any student "with whom the relationship
becomes unpleasant and difficult" could not reasonably be read as a
waiver of notice and hearing before expulsion. Thus he found that
"the right to remain at the college in which the plaintiffs were
students in good standing is an interest of extremely great value" and
that there were "no considerations of immediate danger to the public,
or of peril to the national security, which should prevent the Board
from exercising at least the fundamental principles of fairness by
giving the accused students notice of the charges and an opportunity
to be heard in their own defense."' 9
In what appears to be carefully considered dictum, Judge Rives
15.
1960).
16.
17.
18.
19.

Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 186 F. Supp. 945, 950 (M.D. Ala.
294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961).
Id. at 155.
Id. at 156.
Id. at 157.
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outlined the kind of notice and hearing due process requires. It could
"vary depending upon the circumstances of tlie particular case""6 and
there was no requirement of "a full-dress judicial hearing, with the
right to cross-examine witnesses."'" Nevertheless "the rudiments of an
adversary proceeding 22 must be provided.
Judge Ben Cameron, who thought that the Dixon decision would
require that the federal courts become "a Gargantuan aggregation of
wet nurses or baby sitters," 3 dissented. But the dissent went virtually
unnoticed. The opinion by Judge Rives had the force of an idea whose
time had come and it has swept the field. There are, and doubtless
will be, differences in the application of the Dixon principle and about
particular details of the procedures it recommended. But, with the
exception of dictum in one district court case,24 there has been no
challenge by any court, state or federal, to the basic proposition for
which Dixon stands, that students at a public institution of higher
learning do have constitutional rights that the courts will recognize
and protect.
This turnabout by the law was not accomplished in a vacuum, It
mirrored, perhaps was even compelled by, dramatic changes in the
nature of education itself. A college education is no longer regarded
as a luxury for the fortunate few but as a necessity for most high
school graduates. College students are no longer children who need or
want to be spoonfed but are older and more self-reliant than in earlier
times. In a recent opinion, Judge James E. Doyle, of the Western
District of Wisconsin, spoke eloquently about these changes. There
has been, he wrote,
a profound shift in the nature of American schools and colleges and universities,
and in the relationships between younger and older people. These changes seldom
have been articulated in judicial decisions but they are increasingly reflected
there. The facts of life have long since undermined the concepts, such as in loco
parentis, which have. been invoked historically for conferring upon university

authorities virtually limitless disciplinary discretion.
I take notice that particularly in recent years the universities have become
theaters for stormy and often violent protests over such matters as war and
peace, racial discrimination in our cities and elsewhere, and the quality of
American life; that this phenomenon adds new and unanticipated dimensions to
the regulation of conduct in the universities; and that those charged with
20.
21.

Id. at 158.
Id. at 159.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 160.
24. Greene v. Howard University, 271 F. Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1967), dismissed as ntoot,
No. 21,267 (D.C. Cir., June 17, 1969).
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governance of these institutions have been struggling to preserve the many
competing values involved..
The world is much with the modern state university. Some find this regrettable,
mourning the passing of what is said to have been the old order. I do not share
this view. But whether the developments are pleasing is irrelevant to the present
issue. . . . What is relevant is that in today's world university discriplinary
proceedings are likely to involve many forms of misconduct other than fraternity
hazing or plagiarism, and that the sanctions imposed may involve consequences
for a particular student more grave than those involved in some criminal court
proceedings.?

There are those, as Judge Doyle said, who think that the change
in the universities, and in the relationships between the universities
and the courts, is regrettable. I shall address myself to that issue in
the final section. For now it is enough to recognize the fact that, for
good or for ill, the Constitution has come to the campus. The
fourteenth amendment is no longer "a paltry piece of class
legislation." Two developments at the end of 1968 demonstrate how
far we have come since the Steier case. Since November, 1968, there
has been a monthly publication, College Law Bulletin, so that those interested in this field may keep up to date on developments, just as is
done by their colleagues who are interested in taxation or labor law.
The other development was a quite extraordinary proceeding in
the Western District of Missouri. The judges there already had several
difficult cases involving universities, and, doubtless with reason,
anticipated that more might come. Rather than address the issues
presented on a case-by-case basis, they convened en banc, solicited
briefs from lawyers for interested educational institutions, the
American Civil Liberties Union, the state attorney general, and from
recognized student governments and faculty associations, and on the
basis of these presentations promulgated a 16-page General Order on
Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review of Student
Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education 6 It is a
thoughtful and well-intended document, and contains no small
measure of wisdom, though those who are old-fashioned in these
matters may think that the General Order, and the process by which it
was prepared, smack more of a legislative committee or an
administrative agency than they do of a court of law.
A vast literature has already sprung up on this subject, to which
the contributions of Professor William W. Van Alstyne, of the Duke
25. Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978, 987-88 (W.D. Wis. 1968).
26. 45 F.R.D. 133 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
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Law School, have been most notable.27 There are also a multitude of

decisions from the lower courts, and one from the Supreme Court, as
the judges have sought to define the contours of the new doctrine.
Amid this wealth of precedent the decisions of Judge Johnson, 21 Judge
Doyle, 29 and Judge William E. Miller,30 of the Middle District of

Tennessee, have been especially insightful and influential. Although
most students have gone to the federal courts for relief, on occasion
the state courts have been resorted to, and they also have fully
accepted the new doctrine3'
Although so much has already been written, it is clear that the
last word has not been said, and that there remain many vexing
questions on what it is that the Constitution requires. With no
thought that this either will be the last word, but in the hope that
something of value can still be said on this subject by one who has
been deeply involved in issues of this kind for the last several years, I
undertake to set out, in the next two sections, my understanding of
what the law is, with regard to the constitutional rights of college
students. For this purpose I accept the definition of the great judge
whom this series of lectures memorializes, that law is "the prophecies
of what the courts will do in fact."3 2 I have endeavored to heed the
admonition of Professor Clark Byse "not to fall into the trap of
equating the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment with one's
personal views of desirable procedure." 3 But there is a corollary to
this, as Professor Byse himself has noted on a different occasion, and
27.

Van Alstyne, Procedural Due Process and State University Students, 10 U.C.L.A. L.

REV. 368 (1963); Van Alstyne, Political Speakers at State Universities: Sonie Constitutional

Considerations, II U. PA. L. REV. 328 (1963); Van Alstyne, Student Acadentic Freedom and
the Rule-Making Powers of Public Universities:Some Constitutional Considerations,2 LAW IN
TRANSITION Q. I (1965); Van Alstyne, The Judicial Trend Toward Student Acadenic Freedom,
20 U. FLA. L. REV. 290 (1968); Van Alstyne, The Student as University Resident, 45 DENVER
L.J. 582 (1968).
28. Dickey v. Alabama State Board of Education, 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967);
Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968);
Brooks v. Auburn University, 296 F. Supp. 188 (M.D. Ala. 1969).
29. Goldman v. Olson, 286 F. Supp. 35 (W.D. Wis. 1968); Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F.
Supp. 978 (W.D. Wis. 1968); Marzette v. McPhee, 294 F. Supp. 562 (W.D. Wis. 1968); Breen
v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Wis. 1969); Stricklin v. Regents of the University of
Wisconsin, 297 F. Supp. 416 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
30. Knight v. State Board of Education, 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961); Jones v.
State Board of Education, 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), affirmned, 407 F.2d 834 (6th Cir.
1969).
31. E.g., Goldberg v. Regents of the University of California, 248 Cal. App.2d 867, 57
Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Woody v. Burns, 188 So. 2d 56 (Fla. App. 1966).
32. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 173 (1920).
33. Byse, supra note II, at 140.
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as others have pointed out. Americans often become so obsessed with
questions of constitutionality that they give insufficient attention to
considerations of wise policy?4 The next two sections consider what
the Constitution requires. A wise university may well make a
prudential judgment that it ought to give its students greater freedom,
or more procedural protections, than the Constitution demands of it?5
This distinction between what is required and what is wise
permits me to avoid the difficult issue of the "private" university or

college as distinguished from the public institution. Orthodox learning
has it that it is only the state institution that is bound by the
fourteenth amendment, and the courts, in applying the Dixon
doctrine, continue to so hold? Many writers have doubted whether
there can today really be-a "private" educational institution, and

have suggested lines of reasoning by which the same rules could be
held applicable to Vanderbilt as to the University of Tennessee.37 In

last year's lectures under the auspices of the Permanent Committee
for the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise, Judge Henry J. Friendly
examined that entire question in detail, and found reason to doubt
that so sweeping a rule will or should be adopted3 8 Although I find
Judge Friendly as persuasive on this as he is on so many things, I

think the matter need not now be resolved. Historically private
colleges and universities have allowed more freedom to their students

than has been true at public institutions, 39 and, in the turbulent

34. Byse, The University and Due Process: A Somewhat Diftrent View, 54 AAUP BULL.
143, 147 (1968); Heyman, Some Thoughts on University DisciplinaryProceedings, 54 CALIF. L.
REV. 73 (1966). See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 555-556 (195 1) (concurring opinion).
35. General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review of
Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education. 45 F.R.D. 133, 148
(W.D. Mo. 1968).
36. Browns v. Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969); Grossner v. Trustees of
Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1967) dismissed as moot, No. 21,267 (D.C. Cir., June 17, 1969). Cf University
of Miami v. Militana, 184 So. 2d 701 (Fla. App. 1966). But cf Hammond v. The University of
Tampa, 344 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1965).
37. Goldman, The University and the Liberty of Its Students-A Fiduciary Theory, 54
Ky. L.J. 643, 650 (1966); Johnson, The Constitutional Rights of College Students, 42 TEXAS L.
Rev. 344, 349 (1964); McKay, The Student as Private Citizen, 45 DENVER L. J. 558, 560 (1968);
Van Alstyne, The Judicial Trend Toward Student Acadenic Freedom, 20 U. FLA. L. REv. 290,
291-292 (1968); Developments in the Law-Academuic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 10561064 (1968); Note, Reasonable Rules Reasonably Enforced- Guidelines for University
Disciplinary Proceedings, 53 MINN. L. REV. 301, 305-310 (1968); Comment Private
Government on the Campus-Judicial Review of University Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1347,
1381-1386 (1963). Cf Byse, supra note 34, at 143.
38. H. FRIENDLY, THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE AND THE PUBLIC- PRIVATE PENUMBRA
(1969).
39.
(1966).

WILLIAMSON & COWAN. THE AMERICAN STUDENTS'

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

152-153
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atmosphere on today's campuses, it seems to me unthinkable that the
faculty and administration of any private institution would consider
recognizing fewer rights in their students than the minimum the
Constitution exacts of the state universities, or that their students
would long remain quiescent if a private college were to embark on
such a benighted course.40 Thus, while the discussion is cast in terms
of the state university, I should expect the private institutions to do at
least as much.
One final word before I plunge into the specifics of the
Constitution on the campus. I fear that very few people will like, or
be satisfied with, what I shall say. Embattled university
administrators, aware of the reaction of legislatures and alumni to the
present manifestations of student militancy, can understand the need
to honor constitutional protections but will not accept enthusiastically
the notions that demonstrations are a form of constitutionallyprotected expression and that even the SDS has rights. Deans of
students who grew up in the good old days of in loco parentis still like
to think of themselves as "a friend to the student"" rather than as a
prosecutor in an adversary proceeding.
At the same time my prophecy of "what the courts will do in
fact" will seem hopelessly reactionary to those who believe that every
Supreme Court decision involving free expression and procedural due
process in what Judge Doyle has termed "the non-university
society '4 2 is applicable, mutatis mutandis, to the situation on the
campus.4 3 I am unable to persuade myself that the courts will take so
doctrinaire a view or that they will fail to perceive that "the unique
character of the university as an institution makes translation of
policies difficult."
Finally, what I have to say will be irrelevant, if not
incomprehensible, to those who believe that any form of conduct is
justifiable if intended as a form of protest by highly motivated people.
As Justice Fortas has recently reminded us, the individual "cannot
substitute his own judgment or passion, however noble, for the rules of
40. Beaney, Students, Higher Education, and the Law, 45 DENVER L. J. 511, 518-519
(1968).
41. Johnson, supra note 37, at 352, quoting a rule at The University of Texas not
abandoned until 1967.
42. Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978, 984 (W.D. Wis. 1968).
43. E.g., Lucas, Comment, 45 DENVER L. J. 622, 626-631 (1968).
44. Comment, Private Government on the Campus-Judicial Review o1 Unliversity
Expulsions, 72 YALE L. J. 1347, 1391 (19631.

1969]

THE CONSTITUTION ON THE CAMPUS

1037

law. . . . [He] cannot demand of his government or of other people
obedience to the law, and at the same time claim a right in himself to
break it by lawless conduct, free of punishment or penalty." 4 As a
prediction of what the courts will do in fact, nothing is safer than to
say that the courts will not-and should not-issue their writ at the
behest of those who would "subordinate the 'rule of law' in favor of
more 'fundamental principles' of revolutionary action designed
forcibly to oust governments, courts and all." 4
So it is with confidence only that no one is likely to find
congenial all that I shall have to say that I turn to the specifics of the
problem.
II.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND STUDENT EXPRESSION

AND BEHAVIOR

It would, of course, be a mistake to suppose that the only
substantive rights possessed by, or of importance to, university
students are those recognized in the first amendment. The right not
to be discriminated against on account of race has been protected for
three decades.17 Its contours are now well-defined, although new
problems may arise as universities are asked to practice benign
discrimination on behalf of minority groups and to provide separate
facilities within the institution. I leave that subject, however, to others.
It may be that students have rights of privacy and of personality,
derived from the ninth amendment or found in the "penumbra" of
other constitutional provisions,4 8 that universities must respect. Here,
however, the basic constitutional doctrine is ill-defined, and there is as
yet no case law applying it to the university situation. Thus I limit
myself in this chapter to the most important and controversial rights,
those that are the battleground today on many a campus, the rights of
expression and association embodied in the first amendment.
My thesis here is a simple one, though it presents an apparent
paradox. The first amendment applies with full vigor on the campus
of a public university. To paraphrase only slightly what the Supreme
Court said in February of this year in the important case of Tinker v.
4" it can hardly
Des Moines Independent Community School District,
be argued that either students or professors shed their constitutional
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

A. FoRTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 33 (1968).
Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia University, 287 F. Supp. 535, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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rights to freedom of speech or expression at the campus gate."0 And it
is the full first amendment that must be recognized, not some
subjective, watered-down version of the great protections of that
amendment. But, as I suggested at the end of the last section, this
does not mean that precedents about the meaning of the first
amendment in other areas of life can be indiscriminately transferred
to the university setting. Instead, as the Court said in Tinker, first
amendment -rights must be "applied in light of the special
' 51
characteristics of the school environment."
We cannot think constructively about what the first amendment
means on campus unless we have some coherent understanding of
what the first amendment means. Here, despite the wealth of
precedents, we plunge into one of the murkiest issues of current
constitutional law. The struggles the Supreme Court has had with the
concept of obscenity, for example, and the division between those who
assert that the first amendment is an absolute and those who think the
rights recognized in it may be balanced against other governmental
interests, merely suggest the complexity of the problem. I will not
retrace the process by which I have attempted to think through these
matters and say only that I end up by finding the most useful analysis
to be that presented by my former professor and current Yale
colleague, Thomas I. Emerson, in his thoughtful and comprehensive
book, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment. It is a

disservice to present his thesis in a paragraph or two, but other
elements of his approach will emerge as I indicate how I think the
general theory should be applied to specific situations. He tells us that
the essence of a system of freedom of expression lies in the distinction between
expression and action. The whole theory rests upon the general proposition that
expression must be free and unrestrained, that the state may not seek to achieve
other social objectives through control of expression, and that the attainment of

such objectives can and must be secured through regulation of action. 51

This test seems to me to fit as closely as any single formula can the
bewildering variety of precedents and to be most responsive to the set
of values the first amendment is intended to protect. Indeed this
distinction between expression and action has been increasingly
recognized in so many words by recent decisions of the Supreme
Court. 53 If that distinction is a workable one, it will carry us a long
50.
51.

Id. at 507.
Id. at 506.

52.

EMiERSON. TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT

53.

115 (1966).
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
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way in considering particular problems. Expression must be wholly
free. Neither the state in general, nor the state university in particular,
is free to prohibit any kind of expression because it does not like what
is being said. Reasonable and nondiscriminatory regulations of time,
place, and manner are the only restrictions that can be put on
expression. Action is quite different. It carries no first amendment
shield and can be regulated in any way that the public health, safety,
morals, and welfare require.
Objection will be heard immediately that the distinction is an
illusory one, that, as Harry Kalven has said, "all speech is necessarily
'speech plus.' If it is oral, it is noise and may interrupt someone else;
if it is written, it may be litter." 54 Of course this is true. But the fact
that a distinction is blurred and imprecise does not mean that it
should not be attempted at all. Professor Emerson has addressed
himself to this point in a more recent article.
To some extent expression and action are always mingled; most conduct includes
elements of both. Even the clearest manifestations of expression involve some act,
as in the case of holding a meeting, publishing a newspaper, or even merely
talking. At the other extreme, a political assassination includes a substantial
measure of expression. The guiding principle must be to determine which element
is predominant in the conduct under consideration. Is expression the major
element and the action only secondary? Or is the action the essence and the
expression incidental? The answer, to a great extent, must be based on a common
sense reaction, made in light of the functions and operations of a system of
W 5
freedom of expression

In applying this concept of the first amendment to the problems
of the university, the fact that the state has a proprietary interest in
the land and the buildings is an irrelevancy. Years ago Justice
Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
saw no constitutional problem in an ordinance prohibiting any public
address on Boston Common except by permit from the mayor. "For
the Legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in
a highway or public park," he wrote, "is no more an infringement of
the rights of a member of the public than for the owner of a private
house to forbid it in his house." '56 This decision was affirmed by the
376 (1968); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 508
(1969).
54. Kalven, The Concept oJ the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. I,
23.
55. Emerson, Freedom of Expression in Wartime, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 975, 996-997
(1968).
56. Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 39 N.E. 113 (1895), affirmned, 167 U.S. 43
(1897).
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United States Supreme Court but it is now regarded as "one of the
less admired efforts of Justice Holmes,

5

7

and time has long since

sapped the decision of any vitality. If, as is now clearly the law, there
are first amendment rights that may be exercised in publicly-owned

places, such as a park,5 the grounds of a state capitol," or a bus
terminal,"0 and in privately-owned places such as a company town"' or
a shopping center, 2 the campus can hardly be an exception, and the
63
cases so hold
But it does not advance the analysis to suggest that because a

university is owned by the public and ordinarily open to the public,
decisions on what must be permitted in other places are automatically
applicable to the university. As Justice Fortas wrote last year:
public use does not authorize either the general public or the university faculty
and students to use them in a way which subverts their purpose and prevents
their intended use by others. The public character of a university does not grant
to individuals a license to engage in activities which disrupt the activities to
which those facilities are dedicated 6

The state may be required to tolerate discussions intended to publicize

antiwar views in the Port Authority Bus Terminal. It need not
tolerate such discussions in the reading room of the university library.
The factors to be considered, such as "the character of the place, the

pattern of usual activity, the nature of its essential purpose and the
population who take advantage of the general invitation extended

• . . are essentially the same."6

But examination of these factors

leads to different results in different cases. 7

At the same time, it answers very few questions to say that "the
57. Kalven, supra note 54, at 12.
58. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67
(1953).
59. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
60. Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968).
61. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
62. Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391
U.S. 308 (1968).
63. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969);
Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967). But see Evers v.
Birdsong, 287 F. Supp. 900, 905 (S.D. Miss. 1968).
64. A. FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 46-47 (1968). See also
Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308.
320 (1968).
65. Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968).
66. Id. at 89.
67. See O'Neil, Reflections on the Academic Senate Resolution, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 88. 91
(1966).
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campuses of state universities are public buildings dedicated to a
special function: education. As such, there is no first amendment
objection to limiting the use of these state-owned facilities to the
purpose to which they have been dedicated. 6' 8 An important state
court opinion develops the same thought when it says: "the function
of the University is to impart learning and to advance the boundaries
of knowledge. This carries with it the administrative responsibility to
control and regulate that conduct and behavior of the students which
tends to impede, obstruct or threaten the achievements of its
educational goals.""9 These formulations do not help me because there
is no single meaning of "education" that can be read into such
statements. I agree that "the methods of formal education-lectures,
discussion, research, writing-deserve respect," 70 but not because these
and these alone are "education." Mark Hopkins on a campus log, a
dormitory bull-session, a demonstration in support of Biafra-all of
these are surely forms of education. Indeed, though I regard the
events a year ago at Columbia as illegal, deplorable, and unjustifiable
on any yiew of the first amendment, they were also surely
"educational" in many respects. At the same time, if the university is
free to regulate only those things that tend to impede its
"educational" goals, must it stand by and watch idly as
demonstrators bar access to recruiters, whether from Dow Chemical
or from Vista? A court has held that it need not,7' and I think this
clearly right, but is recruiting "educational"? I would be hard put to
argue that the "educational goals" of The University of Texas would
be impeded if demonstrators were to swarm on the field and prevent
us from playing football against Arkansas-but I have no doubt of
our right to prevent such conduct.
It seems to me closer to the mark to say, as the judges in the
Western District of Missouri have done, that a university is not
obliged to tolerate interference with "any lawful mission, process, or
function of the institution, 712 or, in a simpler phrase, that "the
68. Snyder v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 286 F. Supp. 927, 933 (N.D.
II1. 1968).
69: Goldberg v. Regents of the University of California, 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 879, 57
Cal. Rptr. 463, 472 (1967).
70. Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1132 (1968).
71. Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968).
72. General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review of
Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D. 133, 145
(W.D. Mo. 1968).
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normal .ctivities of the University ' 7 3 are protected. On this view, the
quiet of the library reading room, the decorum of the classroom, and
the pageantry and drama of the stadium are given preference, not
because these are more or less "educational" than a "teach-in" on
Vietnam would be, but because these are the "n6rmal activities" of
the university as defined by those to whom the state has entrusted the
governance of the university. Other activities, to the extent that they
are protected by the first amendment, must be permitted but they
need not be permitted at a time or place that will interfere with the
normal activities.
On the view I take of the matter, that the first amendment
applies with full vigor on the campus, it is a false dichotomy to
suggest, as some have, that there are circumstances in which a
university can limit or forbid "the exercise of a right guaranteed by
the Constitution or a law of the United States to persons generally."
I do not think such a conflict ever can arise, because I do not read
the first amendment as granting rights in a vacuum, but rather as
granting rights that exist at a particular time and place. "The rights of
free speech and assembly, while fundamental in our democratic society,
still do not mean that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may
address a group at any public place and at any time." 75 To revert to an
example I suggested earlier, a rule barring loud discussions in the reading room of the library does not limit "the exercise of a right guaranteed by the Constitution . . . to persons generally," for no one has a
constitutional right to speak in a place so clearly inappropriate. The
nature of the university, and the pattern of its normal activities,
dictate the kinds of regulations of time, place, and manner that are
reasonable, but the first amendment is no bar to reasonable
regulations of that kind 6
There is another way in which different results may be reached
on the campus although the first amendment is fully applicable. A
73. Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 286 (D. Colo. 1968). Cf Jones v. State Board of
Education, 279 F. Supp. 190, 204 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), affirmed, 407 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1969).
74. General Order on Judicial Standards, supra note 72, at 146. See also Van Alstyne,
Student Academic Freedom and the Rule Making Powers oj Public Universities: Some
Constitutional Considerations, 2 LAW IN TRANSITION Q. I, 23 (1965); Note, Reasonable Rules
Reasonably EnJbrced- Guidelines Jbr University Disciplinary Proceedings, 53 MINN. L. REv,
301, 327 (1968).
75. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965).
76. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). See Amalgamated Food Employees
Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 321 (1968); Davis v. Francois, 395
F.2d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 1968); Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83, 93-94 (2d Cir.
1968).
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law, or even a university regulation, prohibiting people from reading
Chapman's translation of Homer would be clearly unconstitutional.
But suppose that a professor of Greek were to make a rule that
students enrolled in a course in which Homer was being studied in the
original must deny themselves for the time being the pleasures of
which Keats wrote so eloquently. The right to read is ordinarily
77
among the freedoms of expression protected by the first amendment,
but for the students in the course in Greek, reading Chapman would
represent action rather than expression-the use of Chapman as a
78
high-class "crib"-and it would be subject to regulation.
We return, then, to the proposition that the first amendment
imposes on the state university, fully as much as on the state itself,
these three rules: (1) Expression cannot be prohibited because of
disagreement with or dislike for its contents. (2) Expression is subject
to reasonable and nondiscriminatory regulations of time, place, and
manner. (3) Expression can be prohibited if it takes the form of
action that materially and substantially interferes with the normal
activities of the institution or invades the rights of others. These
principles can best be understood by seeing how they apply, and how
the courts have interpreted them, in several specific contexts.
The most important of these contexts in terms of what is
happening at our universities today is the right of students to
demonstrate on the campus. Some forms of demonstrations, such as
picketing and parading, are "methods of expression, entitled to first
amendment protection." 79 It would clearly be unreasonable, and
unconstitutional, to seek to ban demonstrations from the campus
entirely.80 A Study Commission at Berkeley has well-described the
situation:
The university is the major community affiliation of students during the years
they are here. The campus (and its immediate geographical periphery) is the
center of their professional and social lives; it is where they eat, sleep, study,
argue, or organize.
It is therefore both natural
meetings, circulate petitions,
to campus facilities, just as
sidewalks, schools, churches,

and appropriate that when students want to have
raise money, or organize activities, they should turn
citizens of other communities use its public parks,
or clubs for similar communal purposes.8'

77. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster General of United
States, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
78. O'Neil, supra note 67, at 93.
79. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 152 (1969).
80. Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947, 951 (D.S.C. 1967).
81.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY,
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This form of expression cannot be barred altogether, nor can it
be barred because those in authority are not sympathetic with the
purpose of a particular demonstration. A requirement that there be
advance permission for a demonstration, with no standards for when
permission is to be given, would be invalid,' 2 since it would allow
expression to be prohibited because of its content. Advance notice of a
demonstration can validly be required, since "notice affords a
desirable opportunity for the administration and the demonstrators to
work out detailed methods for the conduct of the protest in a manner
compatible with the legitimate interests of all." '8 3 It is true that
requirements of notice must be examined with care, since they can be
abused s and the notice rule ought to have enough flexibility to
accommodate the truly spontaneous demonstration in response to
such tragic events as the assassination of Dr. King.85 Even advance
objective, and
approval can -be required, 86 if there are "narrow,
8 s7
definite standards to guide the licensing authority.
The only justification for licensing rules is to permit
implementation of the rules of time, place, and manner. They cannot
be the cloak for censorship of content. Some kinds of regulations of
time and place are obviously necessary as a form of what Professor
Emerson has called "traffic control." 's If the Young Americans for
Freedom have reserved the West Mall for a demonstration at 1:00 on
Friday, Students for a Democratic Society cannot complaih if their
application for the same place and hour is rejected and they are told
to plan on a different time or place. They cannot complain, that is, so
long as, both in principle and in practice, the rules "afford equality of
treatment as between individuals or groups and allow no
8
discrimination on the basis of the content of the expression.
Regulations of manner must be particularly circumscribed. Professor
Robert O'Neil has suggested a useful test. "Manner," he says
UNIVERSITY GOVERNANCE, THE CULTURE OF THE UNIVERSITY: GOVERNANCE AND EDUCATION

36

(1968).

82.

Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967). Cf. Kunz

v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951).
83. Poive v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 84 (2d Cir., 1968).
84. Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83, 94 (2d Cir. 1968).
85. Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 84 (2d. Cir. 1968).
86. Note, Regulation of Demonstrations, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1773, 1784-1785 (1967). See
also Kalven, supra note 54, at 28-29.
87. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151 (1969). Cf. Dickson v.
Sitterson, 280 F. Supp. 486 (M.D.N.C. 1968).
88. EMERSON, supra note 52, at 102.
89. Id.
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should be understood to denote only those physical and procedural incidents of
public expression that are neither "time" nor "place"-for example, the size
and number of posters that can be displayed in certain locations, the volume of
sound amplification, chairmanship of public meetings, identification of persons
soliciting funds, methods of distributing literature, and the myriad other matters
that must be regulated in order effectively to regulate the speech situation. With
this understanding, reference to "manner" should provide no invitation to veiled
censorship

We have seen earlier that the entire campus cannot be declared
off-limits for demonstrations. It does not follow, however, that the
entire campus is a permissible area for demonstrations. "London
does not make all of Hyde Park available for speechifying." 9 1 Judge
Frankel has declared that the controversial rule at Columbia banning
all indoor demonstrations was reasonable beyond any questionj 2 With
deference, I am doubtful about this. Many universities do permit
indoor demonstrations and the life of the university has not been
harmed by them. I cannot accept Professor Van Alstyne's view that
the burden should be on the university to establish that a
demonstration at a particular place would be "manifestly
unreasonable, 9 3 but I do think that a regulation to be reasonable,
and thus valid, must show that consideration has been given to "all of
the nuances of the time, place and manner." 94 A flat rule that there is
not any time when a demonstration can be permitted in any building
seems far too sweeping. Indeed testimony by the Vice President of
Columbia to the Cox Commission showed that the university never
intended to enforce the ban as broadly as it was written. 95 A
regulation that goes farther on its face than in its intended application
opens the door to selective enforcement and thus to censorship.
There are some buildings-the library seems a good example-in
which demonstrations might never be allowed. There are other
buildings in which they might not be allowed at particular times, such
as a classroom building while classes are in session, or a dormitory
during hours when many people are sleeping. It would certainly also
be defensible to designate "the specific places within the building
where the rights of expression may be exercised." 96
90. O'Neil, supra note 67, at 104.
91. Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 85 (2d Cir. 1968).
92. Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia University, 287 F. Supp. 535, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
93. Van Alstyne, The Judicial Trend Toward Student Academic Freedom, 20 U. FLA. L.
REV. 290, 299 (1968).

94.

Davis v. Francois, 395 F.2d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 1968).

95.

CRISIS AT COLUMBIA:

REPORT

OF THE

FACT-FINDING

COMMISSION APPOINTED

96.

TO

1968 at 70 (1968).
Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83, 94 (2d Cir. 1968).
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What is true of buildings is true also of the open areas of the
campus. Although here the justification for declaring particular spots
not permissible will be less common, I cannot think that a university
transgresses the Constitution if it declares that in one area of the
campus demonstrations would endanger ornamental plantings or that
another area is set aside as a place for quiet and contemplation. But
there are three cautions that must be heeded by an institution so minded.
If it intends to prohibit demonstrations in particular places, indoors
or out, it must do so by general rule rather than by ad hoc denial of a
particular applicationY7 Second, if a particular area is off-limits for a
political demonstration it must be off-limits also for football pep
rallies, art auctions, and other equally noisy or congested activities."
Finally, the university must be able to show that it has made available
"adequate alternative areas where the demonstrators can effectively
confront the audience they seek." 9 To bar demonstrations on the
main part of the campus, while providing that they may be held at the
intramural field two miles away, would be an unreasonable charade
and would stand no better constitutionally than a ban on all
demonstrations.
The third of my principles, you will recall, is that expression can
be prohibited if it takes the form of action that materially and
substantially interferes with the normal activities of the institution or
invades the rights of others. This is, of course, the hardest proposition
to apply to demonstrations. The demonstration is intended as a means
of expression. Inevitably it has important elements of action. At what
point does it become impermissible action rather than protected
expression? I have used the phrase "materially and substantially"
interferes since this is the test that the Supreme Court, borrowing
from the Fifth Circuit, announced in the Tinker case.' 0
No one who reads the cases is likely to think that the courts have
erred on the side of being too permissive with regard to disruptive
activity. Indeed the case law is nonexistent as a guide to kinds of
demonstrations that are constitutionally protected. Almost certainly
this is because university administrators have, in general, been
restrained and have imposed the kind of severe disciplinary penalties
that it is worthwhile challenging in court only in the most aggravated
circumstances. "Violent activities," Justice Fortas has said, "should
97. Cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
98. Cf- Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 273 (1951).
99. The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HAV. L. REV. 69, 141 (1967).
100. 393 U.S. at 513.
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be regarded and treated as intolerable. Punishment of on-campus
violence involves risks. . . But the toleration of violence involves, I
think, even greater risks, not only of present damage and injury but of
erosion of the base of an ordered society." 10 1 His view contrasts with
that of Congressman Adam Clayton Powell who argues that "there
should be no limits on dissent whatever," since "that's what you go
to school for," and who thinks that there is a place even for violence
if you have "come to the breaking point when all reason does not
succeed and by some act of violence something can be done to bring
102
those who will not reason to a point of reasonability.
The courts plainly agree with Justice Fortas. They have refused
to find constitutional protection for a demonstration in which
buildings were burned and equipment wantonly damaged. 0 3 Judge
Doyle, who has shown an extraordinary sensitivity in these matters,
ordered a hearing for students suspended from Oshkosh State, but
held that the institution was duty bound to impose severe sanctions on
persons who broke into the president's office, held him prisoner there,
made menacing gestures to him, and destroyed substantial amounts of
property. 0 4 Indeed even a little violence is enough to forfeit first
amendment protection. A demonstration at Central Missouri State
College led to broken windows and destroyed shrubbery, and included
throwing eggs, hanging the dean in effigy, and stopping and rocking
cars. A federal court found that an educational institution can protect
itself "against conduct that would damage or destroy it or its
property in total or in part," and upheld suspension of students
involved for violation of a rule against participating in mass
gatherings that "might be considered as unruly or unlawful."" 5
The case of Barker v. Hardway0 ' is of particular interest. A
peaceful demonstration demanding that students have a greater voice
in the administration of the college was held during the halftime of a
football game at Bluefield State College. When the game resumed the
demonstrators came into the stands and encircled the section where
the president and his guests were sitting. They chanted themes
denouncing the president and held up placards blocking his view. The
101. FORTAS, supra note 64, at 47.
102. New York Times, March 18, 1969, p.9, col. I.
103. Evers v. Birdsong, 287 F. Supp. 900 (S.D. Miss. 1968).
104. Marzette v. McPhee, 294 F. Supp. 562, 569 (W.D. Wis. 1968). See also Trillin, U.S.
Journal: Oshkosh, NEW YORKER, Jan. 4, 1969; p. 6 2 .
105. Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 290 F. Supp. 622, 629 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
106. 283 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.W. Va. 1968), criticized, COLLEGE LAW BULL., April, 1969.
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police then escorted the president to the other side of the
stadium. The demonstrators followed and yelled threats at the
president, attempted to grab him, and threw rocks and bottles at
police officers. When the president left the stadium, the demonstrators
beat upon and rocked his car and attempted to prevent him from
driving from the parking lot. Several of the demonstrators were
suspended, and a district court refused to set the suspensions aside. It
found that by depriving the president and others in lawful attendance
"of the right to see and enjoy the game in peace and with safety to
themselves, they thereby exceeded this constitutional privilege and
forfeited its protection.' 1 7 The Fourth Circuit affirmed, 0 s and the
Supreme Court refused review. 10 9 Justice Fortas, who had been
spokesman for the Court in the Tinker case one week earlier, wrote a
concurring opinion to the denial of certiorari in Barker. He said that
"the petitioners here engaged in an aggressive and violent
demonstration, and not in peaceful, nondisruptive expression, such as
' 0
was involved in Tinker.""
Even where a demonstration results in no harm to persons or
property, and may fairly be regarded as nonviolent, it becomes
punishable action, rather than protected expression, if it leads to
physical obstruction of access to university buildings. It may be, as
has been suggested, that in these cases of nonviolent violation, there is
"sense in patient forbearance despite the wrong that the action
involves.""' Patient forbearance, however, is the result of a prudential
judgment and is not constitutionally compelled." 2 The occupancy of
buildings at Columbia," 3 blocking access to the administration
building at Grambling,"4 sitting-in after closing hours at Sproul Hall
in Berkeley,"' and linking arms to block entrance to the placement
office at Colorado"' have all been held to be beyond first amendment
bounds.
A case that comes close to the borderline, and that emphasizes
107.

Id. at 238.

108.
109.
110.

399 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1968).
394 U.S. 905 (1969).
Id.

III.

FORTAS, supra note 64, at 47.

112. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965); Emerson, supra note 55, at 10031004.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia University, 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
Zanders v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968).
In re Bacon, 240 Cal. App.2d 34, 49 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1966).
Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968).
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how permissive the courts have been to the universities, is the recent
decision by the Second Circuit in Powe v. Miles.117 That case involved
a peaceful and orderly demonstration at an ROTC review at Alfred
University. Sixteen demonstrators formed a line between the reviewing stand and the field on which the cadets were to march. The
demonstrators were an obstacle to the vision of those in the reviewing stand and the lower tiers of the grandstand and made it
necessary to alter certain elements of the ceremony that had been
planned. Those of the demonstrators who refused to comply with
a request from the Dean of Students that they remove themselves
from the field were suspended for violation of a rule that
demonstrators must "avoid disrupting classes or other educational
activities." The suspensions were upheld by the Second Circuit, in an
opinion in which Judge Friendly said:
The fact that the demonstration was much less violent than other unhappy
incidents of the -recent past does not mean it had not passed the limits that
Alfred was required to tolerate; the ROTC cadets and the parerts had rights
118
too.

Though I think the case is a close one, I agree with the result the
court reached. There was a material and substantial interference with
a scheduled activity of the institution. This impermissible action
outweighs the expression the demonstrators were attempting.
A case that happily led to no penalties, and did not reach the
courts, illustrates the other side of the borderline. Recently
demonstrators sat-in at College Hall, at the University of
Pennsylvania, for six days. But unlike demonstrators elsewhere, they
allowed free access within the building and supervision by the campus
police, and classes in the building were not hampered.1 19 If there had
been a valid university rule prohibiting demonstrations in this
particular building or requiring that persons leave it at a certain hour,
even this behavior might not have been permissible, but there was no
such rule. Since the demonstrators were at most an inconvenience,
and their conduct did not materially or substantially interfere with the
normal activities of the university, the demonstration remained a form
of constitutionally-protected expression.
The cases involving demonstrations, though they have reached
what I consider satisfactory results, pose hard problems, in which all
three of the rules I have ventured to set forth in defining the meaning
117. 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
118. Id. at 85.
119. Yale Daily News, March 13, 1969, p.4, col. 5.
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of the first amendment may be intertwined. The cases involving bans
on off-campus speakers are far simpler, since they commonly fall
afoul of the first rule, that expression cannot be prohibited because of
disagreement with or dislike of its contents.
American educational institutions have been notoriously timid
about off-campus speakers. A survey made several years ago on
behalf of the National Association of Student Personnel
Administrators showed that George Lincoln Rockwell would have
been permitted to speak at only 23 per cent of the institutions and
Malcom X at only 33 per cent. Indeed seven per cent of the colleges
and universities would have been hesitant about approving an invitation
to Chief Justice Warren."' As recently as 1964, 65 per cent of the
institutions had no written policy on off-campus speakers,'12 and even
where written policies existed they usually allowed considerable
discretion to administrative officers. In the exercise of this discretion,
administrators commonly took counsel of their fears, fears both of
what the speaker might say and of what the taxpayers or. the alumni
might say. They failed to perceive that, as the Court has now told us
in Tinker:
.. . in our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not
enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression. Any departure from
absolute regimentation may cause trouble. Any variation from the majority's2 2

opinion may inspire fear. .

.But our Constitution says we must take this risk.

Before the state can prohibit a particular expression of opinion, "it

must be able to show that its action was caused by something more
than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that
always accompany an unpopular viewpoint."'
Given the contrast between the demands of the Constitution and
the practices of the universities, it is hardly surprising that I cannot
find a single case decided on its merits in this decade in which a speaker ban has been upheld by a court. Perhaps a university might bar all
off-campus speakers, but the issue is hardly worth pursuing since no
educational institution worthy of the name can or does follow such a
policy. Once some speakers have been allowed, others may not be turned
away "according to the orthodoxy or popularity of their political or
social views," for to do so is "blatant political censorship.' ' 21 Attempts
120.

WILLIAMSON & COWAN,

THE AMERICAN

STUDENTS'

FREEDOM

OF

EXPRESSION

(1966).
121. Id. at 78.
122. 393 U.S. at 508.
123. Id. at 509.
124. Brooks v. Auburn University, 296 F. Supp. 188, 194 (M.D. Ala. 1969).
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to bar certain off-campus speakers have failed in recent months at
Auburn,'12 Illinois, 26 Louisiana State,'2 7 and North Carolina. 28 I am
strongly tempted to believe that the only good speaker ban is one that
has not yet been tested in court. It is not only the speaker invited by a
campus group who must be tolerated. A university can have a rule
limiting the use of college premises to those invited by student groups,
faculty members, or the administration, 29 but if it has a practice of
making its facilities available to outside organizations, it cannot
refuse the facilities to those organizations or speakers it does not
like.'30
A speaker cannot be refused permission to speak on campus
because he has been convicted of a felony 3' or is under indictment for
murder, 13 2 or because he urges or advocates violation of the laws,'33 or
because he is an admitted member of the Communist Party. 3 A
speaker may not be required to promise that he will not use his speech
to publicize the activities of any "subversive, seditious, and unAmerican organization.' ' 31 A forum cannot constitutionally be denied
to "subversive elements' '1 36 nor even to groups seeking overthrow of
the government by force or violence. 3 7 It will not do to limit speakers
to those who "clearly serve the advantage of education" or to lease
125. Id.
126. Snyder v. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois, 286 F. Supp. 927 (N.D. Ill.
1968).
127. Student Liberal Federation v. Louisiana State University, Civ. No. 68-300 (E.D. La.,
Feb. 15, 1968).
128. Dickson v. Sitterson, 280 F. Supp. 486 (M.D.N.C. 1968). See also Smith v. University
of Tennessee, No. 6557 (E.D. Tenn., April 18, 1969).
129. Van Alstyne, Political Speakers at State Universities: Some Constitutional
Considerations, I I I"U. PA. L. REV. 328, 340 (1963).
130. Buckley v. Meng, 35 Misc. 2d 467, 230 N.Y.S. 2d 924 (1962). Cf. Bynum v. Schiro,
219 F. Supp. 204 (E.D. La. 1963); American Civil Liberties Union v. Board of Education of
City of Los Angeles, 55 Cal.2d 167, 359 P.2d 45 (1961); Danskin v. San Diego Unified School
District, 28 Cal.2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946); EMERSON, supra note 52, at 110- Ill.
131. Brooks v. Auburn University, 296 F. Supp. 188 (M.D. Ala. 1969).
132. Student Liberal Federation v. Louisiana State University, Civ. No. 68-300 (E.D. La.,
Feb. 15, 1968).
133. Brooks v. Auburn University, 296 F. Supp. 188 (M.D. Ala. 1969). Cf Bynum v.
Schiro, 219 F. Supp. 204 (E.D. La. 1963).
134. Egan v. Moore, 20 A.D. 2d 150, 245 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1963), affirmed, 14 N.Y.S.2d
775, 199 N.E.2d 842 (1964).
135. Snyder v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 286 F. Supp. 927 (N.D. Ill.
1968).
136. Danskin v. San Diego Unified School District, 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946).
137. American Civil Liberties Union v. Board of Education of City of Los Angeles, 55
Cal. 2d 167, 359 P.2d 45 (1961).
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the auditorium only for programs "determined to be compatible with
the aims of [the college] as an institution of higher learning."' 38
The lesson of these cases has not been learned everywhere. At my
own institution, The University of Texas, we have a rule that begins,
soundly enough, by asserting that "freedom of inquiry and discussion
are basic and essential to intellectual development," but that quickly
goes on to bar from speaking on campus any person "who is known
to advocate or recommend, either orally or in writing, the conscious
and deliberate violation of any federal, state or local law."' 3 The
notion that "a prohibition resting solely on the credentials of the
speaker seems completely beyond justification"'' is not easily or
painlessly grasped. In a recent survey of more than 200 college
presidents, 30.3 per cent said that they "disagree completely" with the
propositions that "students should be allowed to hear any person of
their own choosing," and that "institutional control of campus
facilities should never be used as a device of censorship.' 1
Fortunately the legal doctrines here are clear and the tools readily
available for those who would challenge restrictive rules.
It seems to me quite instructive to compare the results in the cases
involving demonstrations with those dealing with speaker bans. The
speaker ban cases involve expression only, and the courts rigidly
refuse to permit any censorship of expression. The demonstration
cases, on the other hand, involve action as a means of expression, and
here the courts have allowed the universities to punish the action as
they will.
The next group of cases raise the question of the extent to which
an institution's interest in preserving respect for constituted authority
and an atmosphere conducive to learning is in itself enough to justify
institutional discipline. I approach the cases warily since, with two
exceptions, they involve high schools, and I find no more reason to
believe that the rules applicable to high schools can be
indiscriminately transferred to institutions of higher learning than I
do to think that decisions involving non-academic functions of the
state can be so transferred. The average university student is more
138. Dickson v. Sitterson, 280 F. Supp. 486 (M.D.N.C. 1968); Buckley v. Meng, 35 Misc.
2d 467, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1968). See also Smith v. University of Tennessee, No. 6557 (E,D.
Tenn., April 18, 1969).
139. RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF TIlE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS
SYSTEM, Part i,c.Vi. §§ 7.1, 7.26 (1969).
140. Developments in the Law-Academnic Freedom,. supra note 70, at 1133.
141. Opinion. College Management, Dec. 1966, p.3 2 .
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than 21 years old'4 2 and is surely an adult. The average high school
student is in his mid-teens, and we have been authoritatively taught
that even in the area of free'expression important consequences can 4be3
made to "depend upon whether the citizen is an adult or a minor."'
It should be clear, however, that university students do not have
fewer rights than high school pupils. Accordingly, to the extent that
the cases draw a line beyond which high school authorities cannot go,
we are safe in saying that university administrators can surely go no
farther. The leading case is the Tinker decision handed down by the
Supreme Court in February of this year. 4 The holding in Tinker was
that the Des Moines School District could not punish students for
wearing black armbands as a form of protest against the Vietnam
war, in violation of a school regulation prohibiting the wearing of
armbands. The case was an easy one, since the Des Moines schools
did not prohibit the wearing of all symbols of political or
controversial significance. Campaign buttons, and even the Iron Cross,
had been tolerated. Thus the school authorities appeared to have
singled out expression of one particular opinion and to have
prohibited that alone. This is clearly invalid, on the same principle
that is at the heart of the speaker ban cases.
But the language of Tinker, and, I think, its holding, are broader
than this. Great emphasis was placed on the fact that the students
involved did not interrupt school activities or seek to intrude in the
school affairs or the lives of others. Though the armbands led to
discussion outside of the classrooms, they caused no interference with
Wearing of armbands was said to involve
work and no disorder.'
"direct, primary First Amendment rights akin to 'pure speech.' ", A
high school student is free to express his opinion, the Court said,
if he does so "without materially and substantially interfering with appropriate
discipline in the operation of the school" and without colliding with the rights of
others. . . . But conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any
reason-whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior-materially
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of
others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of
speech." 7

The Tinker opinion draws heavily on two cases decided by a
142.
143.
144.
145.

Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978, 988 (W.D. Wis. 1968).
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
Id.at 514.

146.
147.

Id.at 508.
Id.at 513.
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panel of the Fifth Circuit in 1966. Principals of two Mississippi high
schools had announced that their students could not wear at school
"freedom buttons," small buttons supporting civil rights. At each of
the schools some students continued to wear the buttons and were
suspended. The Fifth Circuit ordered the students reinstated at one of
the schools.'
It found the regulation against "freedom buttons"
arbitrary and unreasonable, in the absence of any showing that the
buttons had interfered with educational activity or caused a
commotion or distracted the other students. But at the second school
the same court allowed the suspensions to stand.' There the record
showed that students had been accosting other students by pinning
buttons on them even though they did not ask for one, and the court
accepted as a fact in its opinion a statement in an affidavit from the
school board that this "created a state of confusion, disrupted class
instruction, and resulted in a general breakdown of orderly
discipline."' ' 0 I have my doubts about the second case. I think that
the court may have been too quick to accept the conclusory statement
of the school board about the dire consequences that had been caused,
and in any event share the wonder Judge Tuttle later expressed about
why the school did not discipline the small number of button-wearers
who created noise and disturbance rather than striking at the wearing
1
of buttons itself.'5
However doubtful the application of the principle in the second
"freedom button" case, the principle itself is sound enough, and has
been fully accepted by the Supreme Court in Tinker.
The three remaining cases on this point suggest what the
principle of the "freedom button" cases may mean in practice, since
all three of them purported to follow the test as laid down by the
Fifth Circuit even before that test was accepted by the Supreme Court
in Tinker. In one, two high school students were expelled for handing
out on the school grounds a mimeographed journal, which, among
other things, called the school attendance regulations "utterly idiotic
and asinine," accused a faculty member of having a "sick mind,"
and urged students to refuse to accept "propaganda" published by the
school's administration. 52 It was conceded that the distribution of this
148.
149.
150.
151.
(dissenting
152.

Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Education, 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
Compare id. at 7"51 with id. at 751 n.2.
Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District, 392 F.2d 697, 705 n.I (5th Cir. 1968)
opinion).
Scoville v. Board of Education of Joliet Twp., 286 F.Supp. 988 (N.D. II1. 1968).
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journal caused no commotion or disruption of classes. On the
principle of the Fifth Circuit cases, and now of Tinker, that would
seem to have required that the students be reinstated, but the district
court in Illinois ruled to the contrary. It found that the students had
engaged in "immediate advocacy of, and incitement to, disregard of
school administrative procedures" and that this by itself "constitutes
a direct and substantial threat to the successful operation of the
school."' 53 It concluded that "the interest of the state in maintaining
the school system outweighs the protection afforded the speaker by
54
the First Amendment.'
The result just described seems to me quite wrong. In the absence
of a showing of any disruption of the work of the school or any
disorder or any invasion of the rights of others-much less the
"material and substantial" interference Tinker requires-it seems to
me inescapable that these two students were expelled because the
school authorities did not like what they were saying, and that this is
what the Constitution prohibits. And, on the analysis I have offered,
the right to expression of a point of view, so long as it does not merge
into impermissible conduct, cannot be outweighed by some other
supposed interest of the state.
The two remaining cases deal, at last, with college students. In
one, Dickey, the editor of the student newspaper at Troy State College,
was suspended for a year for "insubordination." He had prepared an
editorial praising the president of the University of Alabama for
taking a public stand in support of academic freedom for university
students, in the face of criticism of this stand by some state
legislators. First the faculty advisor and then the president of Troy
State refused to permit publication of the editorial, relying on a rule the
president had made against any editorials critical of the governor of
Alabama or of members of the legislature. The faculty advisor,
incredibly, ordered published in place of the editorial some material
on "Raising Dogs in North Carolina." Dickey instead left the
editorial column blank, except for the word "Censored" run
diagonally across the column. It was for this "insubordination" that
he was suspended. The federal court, in a strong opinion by Judge
Johnson, ordered his reinstatement.155 Although the action was later
ordered dismissed as moot when Dickey transferred to another college
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 992.
Id.
Dickey v. Alabama State Board of Education, 273 F.Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967).
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during the pendency of the appeal, and the Fifth Circuit, in ordering
the dismissal, made the surprising statement that this took away from
the decision below "any precedential effect,"'' 6 it is interesting to note
that Judge Johnson's opinion in the Dickey case is twice cited
approvingly by the Supreme Court in the Tinker case. 5
Dickey's suspension was purportedly for his insubordinate
conduct, but in fact it was because he had exercised his
constitutionally protected right of expression. Any damage that
Dickey's reinstatement would cause to discipline at Troy State was
outweighed by the damage that would result from the imposition of
intellectual restraints, such as had been attempted.
The other case, Jones v. State Board of Education,' was decided

by Judge Miller of this district, whose earlier decision in Knight v.
State Board of Education'59 is one of the great landmark cases in

bringing the Constitution to the campus. The Jones case has very
recently been affirmed by the Sixth Circuit. In Jones three students at
Tennessee A. & I. State University challenged their indefinite
suspension. The stated ground for suspension of one was that he had
distributed literature promoting unrest on campus. A second was
found to have caused publicity that tainted the reputation of the
institution, to have talked and acted in a manner calculated to cause
unrest, and to have disrupted a meeting of the student body and
shown gross disrespect for university officials. The third student was
found to have treated the president of the university with gross
disrespect and to have disrupted an otherwise orderly meeting to the
point it could not be continued. The students argued that their cases
involved "speech in its pure or pristine form" since there were no
6
accompanying demonstrations or picketing."
Judge Miller conceded
that there were no demonstrations but found that "there was other
conduct of the plaintiffs disrupting and undermining University
proceedings," and that they were not punished "because they
exercised their First Amendment freedoms."' 6 This seems a proper
conclusion with regard to the second and third students, insofar as
they had disrupted meetings, since this kind of disruption of normal
activities is impermissible action rather than protected expression. The
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Troy State University v. Dickey, 402 F.2d 515, 516 (5th Cir. 1968).
393 U.S. at 506 n.2, 514.
279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), affirmed, 407 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1969).
200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).
279 F. Supp. at 204.
Id.

1969]

THE CONSTITUTION ON THE CAMPUS

case might stand on stronger ground if it were clear that the
suspensions were for the disruptive activities only, and did not rest in
part on the charges of disrespect to university officials. Even if a
threat "to eliminate you and to tear this joint down ' 12 might be
thought to go beyond constitutional bounds, I have serious doubt
whether referring to members of the administration as "Uncle
Tom'1 3 is a permissible basis for discipline. My greatest difficulty
with the Jones case is with the first student, who was found only to
have distributed literature designed to promote unrest on the campus.
If the distribution of literature did disrupt the normal educational
activities of the institution, as is briefly suggested at one point in the
opinion,'
discipline would be appropriate. But if, though the
literature was intended to promote unrest, its distribution did not have
a disruptive effect, the case would seem to me similar to that of the
Illinois high school students, and I would classify the behavior as
expression rather than action.
As is suggested by my discussion of the high school students who
wrote that a teacher had a "sick mind" and the Tennessee A. & I.
student who used the phrase "Uncle Tom," it seems to me that
speech cannot be punishable on campus simply because it is vigorous
or uncomplimentary. I fully share the view of the Cox Commission
that the life of a university depends on "the pursuit of truth and
knowledge solely through reason and civility,"'6 5 and that lack of
civility leads only to a harmful polarization of opinion,'66 but it is
perfectly clear that the first amendment did not enact Mrs. Emily
Post's book of etiquette. This does not mean that every form of words
is acceptable in university discourse. Surely the holding of the
Chaplinsky case, 6 7 that there are some "fighting words" not
protected by the first amendment because they inflict injury by their
very utterance, has no less force on the campus than on the city street.
And, in common with Professor Van Alstyne, 68 I accept the basic
holding, though not all of the analysis, of a California court in the
Goldberg case,' that participants in Berkeley's "Filthy Speech
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
REV. 290,
169.

Id. at 201.

Id.
Id. at 204.
CRISIS AT COLUMBIA, supra note 95, at 196.

Id. at 198.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
Van Alstyne, The Judicial Trend Toward Student Academic Freedom. 20 U. FLA. L.
299 n.31 (1968).
248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
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Movement" were properly suspended for having "repeatedly, loudly
and publicly [used] certain terms which, when so used, clearly
infringed on the minimum standard of propriety and the accepted
norm of public behavior of both the academic community and the
broader social community."' 70 There are words that are not regarded
as obscene, in the constitutional sense, that nevertheless need not be
permitted in every context. Words that might properly be employed in
a term paper about Lady Chatterley's Lover or in a novel submitted
in a creative writing course take on a very different coloration if they
are bellowed over a loudspeaker at a campus rally or appear
prominently on a sign posted on a campus tree. To paraphrase
Professor Emerson, if a shock effect is produced by forcing offensive
language upon a person contrary to his wishes, the harm is direct,
immediate, and not controllable by regulating subsequent action.
Realistically it can be considered an "assault" on the other person
and dealt with as action rather than expression.' This, I think, was
what the Supreme Court had in mind in the Redrup case when it
spoke of "an assault upon individual privacy by publication in a
manner so obtrusive as to make 2 it impossible for an unwilling
'
individual to avoid exposure to it.'
The first amendment protects not only rights of expression but
also rights of association. These are of great importance in university
life, because many of the things students wish to accomplish can be
achieved only by organizing. Although these issues are lively ones on
many campuses, they have not yet reached the courts in numbers
significant enough to create any body of doctrine. Cases dealing with
racial discrimination by Greek-letter organizations 3 can be put to
one side. The mandate of the equal protection clause, and of federal
legislation providing aid to universities, is so clear that universities
can hardly lend their recognition or their facilities to discriminatory
organizations. In addition, the social group is hardly comparable to
an organization of a political nature.
Students feel very strongly that they should not be required to
give to a university membership lists of an organization, and many
highly respected professional associations, in a Joint Statement on
Rights and Freedoms of Students,' agree. The issue has not come to

172.

Id. at 880, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 472-473.
EMERSON, supra note 52, at 91.
Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 769 (1967).

173.

E.g.. Sigma Chi Fraternity v"Regents of the University of Colorado, 258 F.Supp.

170.

171.

515 (D. Colo. 1966).
174. 53 AAUP BULL. 365, 366 (1967).
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the courts directly, although there is an interesting opinion by Judge
Doyle holding that a legislative investigation of campus riots could
not obtain membership lists of organizations unless it were first
shown that the particular organizations had planned or participated in
the riots.17 5 There is also an unpublished opinion by a state trial court
in Wisconsin holding that the university could deny recognition to the
local chapter of SDS.1Y6 The reasoning is that the organization was
not suppressed or forbidden to exist, and was merely denied certain
privileges as a consequence of the lawful authority of the university to
govern its affairs. The argument is unconvincing. An organization
surely may be denied campus privileges if it has violated university
rules that are in themselves valid. But if these privileges are denied as
a form of political censorship, the principle that has controlled in the
speaker-ban cases would apply, and the university would be required
to treat all groups similarly.
I have now completed my examination of the substantive
restrictions imposed on state universities by the first amendment. In
the next section I turn to the procedural restrictions necessary to give
these meaning.
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL

PROTECTION

OF PROCEDURE

IN STUDENT

DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS

"The history of liberty," Justice Frankfurter noted in a famous
sentence, "has largely been the history of observance of procedural
safeguards.' ' 7 Indeed we saw in section I that the path-breaking case
of Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education178 in which the
Constitution was first brought to the campus, dealt entirely with
procedural safeguards. The cases reviewed in section II, applying the
substantive limits of the first amendment to universities, were a later
development. Without procedural safeguards the substantive
protections would be virtually useless. There would be no point in an
elaborate doctrine that students may be disciplined for disruptive
action but not for mere expression if some administrator were
permitted to make an ex parte and unreviewable determination that
particular behavior was "disruptive action" and that a particular
student had participated in it. In a system of ordered liberty, therefore,
175. Goldman v. Olson, 286 F. Supp. 35 (W.D. Wis. 1968).
176. Saxton v. Board of Regents of State Colleges, No. 123-165 (Cir. Ct. Dane Co. Wis.,
May 21, 1968).
177. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).
178. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.'1961).
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it is essential that substantive rules be applied through fair and reliable
procedures.

My thesis in the preceding section was that the full first
amendment, and not some watered-down version of it, applies on the
campus. In this section my argument is rather different. It is that the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not impose on

universities any particular procedural model, whether it be derived
from criminal, civil, or administrative proceedings. Instead the
courts should accept any institutional procedure so long as it is
reasonably calculated to be fair to the student involved and to lead to

a reliable determination of the issues. "The touchstones in this area
are fairness and reasonableness."' 79 To say this is only to recognize
what the Supreme Court has told us:
"Due process" is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries are undefinable, and
its content varies according to specific factual contexts. . . . Whether the
Constitution requires that a particular right obtain in a specific proceeding
depends upon a complexity of factors. The nature of the alleged right involved,
the nature of the proceeding, and the possible burden on that proceeding, are
all considerations which must be taken into account. 80

In another case the Court expressed the same thought:
The Fifth Amendment does not require a trial-type hearing in every conceivable
case of government impairment of private interest. . . . The very nature of due
process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to
every imaginable situation. 8 '

With this general concept of flexibility, tested only in terms of
fairness and reasonableness, it is possible to canvass some of the kinds
of questions that arise. I turn first to an issue that overlaps the always
indistinct boundary between substance and procedure, but one that
seems to me of fundamental importance. To what extent may students
be disciplined for violation of vague and general rules?
In section II, I discussed the case of Jones v. State Board of
Education.8 The regulations at Tennessee A. & I., under which the
students were suspended, prohibited: "(1) Disrespect for University
authority; (2) Any act in violation of city, county, state, or federal
law; and (3) Any other infractions of standards of conduct that
179. Due v. Florida A and M University, 233 F. Supp. 396, 403 (N.D. Fla. 1963). See
also Jones v. State Board of Education, 279 F. Supp. 190, 205 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), ajfirined,
407 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1969).
180. Hannah v. Lat1'he, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
181. Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers' Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894-895
(1961).
182. 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), affirmed, 407 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1969).
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require severe disciplinary action."'1' The students, not unnaturally,
challenged these regulations as being unduly vague. In rejecting that
challenge, Judge Miller said:
The plaintiffs here are not attacking a state statute. Rather, the attack is upon
student regulations found in a university handbook. No case is cited to this
Court in which an attack upon a student regulation as being unconstitutionally
vague has been sustained."'

As a descriptive statement, that was, at the time it was written,
wholly accurate. A few samples will give the flavor of the kinds of
regulations that have been considered sufficient by the courts. At one
institution the rules require students "to respect the rights and
privileges of other people; and to conduct themselves in such manner
that reflects credit upon the University," and also prohibit "injury to
property on the campus or elsewhere and interference in any manner
with the public or private rights of citizens." These rules, a court
said, "set standards for acceptable conduct which are readily
determinable and should be easily understood." 1 5 Another case
upheld a rule requiring "decorous, sober and upright conduct of every
student both on and off campus" and prohibiting conduct that "fails
to show respect for good order, moral actions, personal integrity,
rights of others, or for the care of property."' 8 6 A California court
felt it need not even consider a challenge on vagueness grounds to a
rule at Berkeley requiring "good taste," "proper conduct," and
"acceptable conduct," since it found that a university has "inherent
general powers to maintain order on the campus and to exclude
therefrom those who are detrimental to its well being.' '1 87 A
university, on this view, needs no rules at all.
Such sonorous generalities, masquerading as rules, are doubtless
to be found in the catalogues of many of our greatest educational
institutions. The courts have been extraordinarily tolerant of them.
And a student commentator supports the view that "a university
regulation can legitimately be couched in general terms" on the
ground that to require specific regulations "would force university
officials to spend unknown time drafting regulations rather than
183. Id. at 201.
184. Id. at 202. See also Hutt v. Brooklyn College, 68 Civ. 691 (E.D.N.Y. July 30, 1968).
185. Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F.Supp. 280, 284 (D. Colo. 1968).
186. Barker v. Hardway, 283 F.Supp. 228, 235 (S.D.W. Va. '1968), affirmed, 399 F.2d
638 (4th Cir. 19'68).
187. Goldberg v. Regents of the University of California, 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 881, 57
Cal. Rptr. 463, 473 (1967).
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carrying out more pressing administrative duties." ' Thus it is not
surprising to find the judges of the Western District of Missouri, in
their General Order with regard to student discipline, telling the
universities affirmatively that they need do no more. They wrote:
Outstanding educational authorities in the field of higher education believe, on
the basis of experience, that detailed codes of prohibited student conduct are
provocative and should not be employed in higher education.
For this reason, general affirmative statements of what is expected of a student
may in some areas be preferable in higher education. Such affirmative standards
may be employed, and discipline of students based thereon.
The legal doctrine that a prohibitory statute is void if it is overly broad or
unconstitutionally broad does not, in the absence of exceptional circumstances,
apply to standards of student conduct 89

With the utmost respect for able judges who have taken this
position, I submit that this is wholly wrong. I think the premises for
this view are demonstrably unsound, and that I am prophesying what
the courts will do in fact, and not reading my own personal view of
desirable procedure into the fourteenth amendment, when I say that
the conclusion reached is an erroneous one.
Take first the premise that "outstanding educational authorities"
think that detailed codes are "provocative and should not be
employed in higher education." For that proposition the only
authority cited is a 1961 book on student personnel work."' o Whatever
may have been thought in 1961, the whole nature of the studentinstitution relation has changed since that time. Such outstanding
educational authorities as the American Association of University
Professors, the National Student Association, the National
Association of Student Personnel Administrators, the National
Association of Women Deans and Counsellors, and the American
Association of Higher Education have recently endorsed a Joint
Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students, in which they say
that the behavioral expectations of universities should be expressed in
"specific regulations" and that "offenses should be as clearly defined
as possible."' 9'
There may be fears that a detailed code will be
"'provocative"-but there is painful experience with the price paid for
188.

Note, 5 HOUSTON L. REV. 541, 547 (1968).
189. General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review of
Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D. 133, 146
(W.D. Mo. 1968).
190. Id., citing BRADY & SNOXELL, STUDENT PERSONNEL WORK IN HIGHER EDUCATION
378 (1961).
191.

53 AAUP BULL. 365, 368 (1967). Seealso 51 AAUP BULL. 447, 449 (1965).
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vagueness and uncertainty. An able historian of the difficulties at
Berkeley says that "one of the most persistent problems for both
students and administrators on the campus of the University of
California at Berkeley during the fall semester 1964 was that of
ascertaining what the prevailing rules and regulations were." 2 'The

Cox Commission, officially created 'to look into the troubles at
Columbia, found uncertainty about the rules a principal cause. It

commented:
The undeniable value of administrative flexibility may be purchased only at the
overriding cost of an unclarity, which opens an administration to charges of
arbitrariness on the one hand, or weakness on the other, and thus may cost it the
93
moral support that milder and more explicit forms of regulation might enjoy.

At the University of Oregon it has been found entirely workable
to proceed on the principles that penalties are to be imposed only for

violation of a pre-existing rule and that rules, must be sufficiently
precise to control discretion and to inform students what may lead to

discipline.'94 Professor Hans Linde, in his valuable discussion of
student discipline from the perspective of the Oregon campus, says:
It is a fiction that no university code can adequately inform students of all rules
duly adopted that carry disciplinary sanctions, and limit all discipline to
infractions of rules so adopted and stated, without including some very general
catchall rules of good conduct to cover a myriad of unanticipated forms of bad
behavior. Such a claim reflects more indignation that bad conduct may escape
university sanctions-the urge to punish-than concern with any clearly
understood institutional need. True, some highly delinquent students may evade
code sanctions (though not legal- prosecution) while a code rule is drawn or
amended: but the university will likely survive. 95

These fears that a single student may go unpunished "widen the gap
of mistrust on the American campus, breeding greater discord and

stronger rebellions.'

96

I am sympathetic to the fear of the student commentator

previously quoted that requiring specific regulations requires

"unknown time" to be spent drafting regulations "rather than

192. Sherry, Governance of the University: Rides, Rights and Responsibilities, 54
L. REV. 23, 37 n.35 (1966).
193.

CRISIS AT COLUMBIA:

INVESTIGATE THE DISTURBANCES

(1968).
194.
.(1966).
195.
196.
(1968).

REPORT OF THE FACT-FINDING
AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

CALIF.

COMMISSION APPOINTED TO

IN APRIL AND

Linde, Campus Law: Berkeley Viewed Front Eugene, 54
Id. at 63.
Note, Uncertainty in College DisciplinaryRegulations, 29

MAY,

CALIF.

OHIO ST.

L.

1968 at 70
REV. 40, 52

L.J. 1023, 1036
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carrying out more pressing administrative duties." I participated in
the drafting of such a code at The University of Texas-though there
the task was given, as I think it should be, to a faculty-student
committee rather than to administrative officials-and spent more
than 300 hours at committee meetings, to say nothing of the time
required for independent research and reflection. But what more
pressing duty is there for any of us involved in the life of a university
than to put our internal affairs into a condition that will narrow "the
gap of mistrust" and, hopefully, spare our campus the anguish of
Berkeley and Columbia.
What I have said so far, however, may be thought to establish
only that specific rules are desirable, not that they are constitutionally
required. This is true-but this is only the preamble to my argument.
The main thesis is that a general rule of the kind I described earlier.
does not meet the touchstones of fairness and reasonableness.1
Students of common intelligence "must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application,"' 97 and it leaves far too
much to the unqualified discretion of those who apply it.' A
commentator has asked pertinent questions about the Berkeley rule
that was cast in terms of "good taste," "proper conduct," and
"acceptable conduct. "'9
The thoughtful young man may wonder to whom his conduct must be
"acceptable," what is "proper" and what "good taste" requires. Is it in good
taste to demonstrate against the Viet Nam War? Or is he required to support it?
Is criticism of the general conduct rule "proper"? May the editor of the student
20
newspaper criticize the governor of the state?

If rules of this generality are permissible then students have gained
something, but not very much, from the decisions requiring
procedural safeguards to be observed. It will do a student very little
good to be given every protection of procedural due process ever
thought of anywhere if, in the end, he may be expelled because the
tribunal is free to apply a subjective judgment about what is
acceptable conduct. This would be neither fair nor reasonable. Nor
would the hard-won substantive protections be of much help. If the
institution is no longer free to discipline a student because he
197. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
198. Van Alstyne, The Judicial Trend Toward Student Academic Freedom, 20 U. FLA. L.
REV. 290, 295 (1968).
199. See Goldberg v. Regents of the University of California, 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 871,
57 Cal. Rptr. 463, 466 (1967).
200.

Note, Uncertainty in College DisciplinaryRegulations, supra note 20, at 1023.
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peacefully expresses unpopular political views, how easy it would be to
proceed against him indirectly on the ground that an unkempt
appearance or bizarre clothes violated the interdictions about "good
taste" and "proper conduct." For these reasons, I think it no
overstatement to say that the single most important principle in
applying the Constitution on the campus should be that discipline
cannot be administered on the basis of vague and imprecise rules.
This principle, I dare to prophesy, is the one that in the long run
the courts will in fact accept. To apply to university rules the same
requirements of specificity that are applied to criminal statutes is not
to do much. The courts, in the criminal area, have been sympathetic
to the problems of drafting involved and have given a generous
reading to what is sufficient to avoid the vice of vagueness. Statutes
prohibiting "obscene or indecent" matter have been upheld against a
vagueness attack,.01 though the Court itself has written 55 separate

opinions in 13 cases, endeavoring, to explain what obscenity

is

2

02

A

statute barring picketing "near" a courthouse has been praised as "a
precise, narrowly drawn regulatory statute" despite "some lack of

specificity in a word such as 'near.'

''203

And the Court said of a

statute banning "mass demonstrations in such a manner as to
obstruct or unreasonably interfere with free ingress to or from any
public premises" that it "clearly and precisely delineates its reach in
words of common understanding." 24
The Court has not required that criminal statutes be drawn with
the precision of multiplicatibn tables. Even when first amendment
freedoms are implicated, the forbidden conduct need not be delineated
by metes and bounds. No more will be expected of university rules.
No less should be tolerated.
I am helped in my conviction that this is the position the courts
will ultimately take by several recent cases. There are first the cases
striking down speaker bans on the ground of vagueness 0 I recognize
that these are not on all fours with regulations of conduct, but they
do suggest that the void-for-vagueness principle does not disappear
201. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491 (1957).
202. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 705 n.l (1968) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting),
203. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 564 (1965).
204. Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 616 (1968).
205. Smith v. University of Tennessee, No. 6557 (E.D. Tenn., April 18, 1969); Brooks v.
Auburn University, 296 F. Supp. 188 (M.D. Ala. 1969); Dickson v. Sitterson, 280 F. Supp. 486
(M.D.N.C. 1968).
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when the Constitution comes in the campus gate. I am helped even
more by. the very recent opinion of Judge Doyle in the case of Soglin
v. Kauffman!" Judge Doyle specifically rejects the view of the judges
of the Western District of Missouri that detailed codes are not
required because "outstanding educational authorities" find them
"provocative," saying that he "cannot agree that university students
should be deprived of these significant constitutional protections on so
slender a showing. 20 7 He holds that "the constitutional doctrines of
vagueness and overbreadth are applicable, in some measure, to the
standard or standards to be applied by the university in disciplining
its students, 2 8 and that a general prohibition of "misconduct" is
unconstitutionally vague and insufficient as the basis for expulsion or
suspension for a significant period.
Judge Doyle also found invalid a poorly-drafted regulation at the
University of Wisconsin that, charitably construed, prohibited
students from "supporting causes by means which disrupt the
operations of the university, or organizations accorded the use of
university facilities." This he found defective for failing to speak to the
elements of intention, or proximity of cause and effect, or of
substantiality, and for lacking even the most general description of the
kinds of conduct that might be considered disruptive 9
Although I welcome the recognition of the vagueness doctrine in
Soglin, I have more doubt about the similar acceptance it gave to the
"'overbreadth" concept.2 0 This rule, that one who has violated a clear
statute by conduct not constitutionally protected may nevertheless
have the statute declared void on its face if it also purports to reach
other behavior that is protected by the first amendment,2 1 has always
seemed to me an exorbitant price to pay to avoid the "'chilling effect"
it is feared the overbroad statute will have on protected expression. To
permit injunctive relief against such a statute makes sense, but to
allow this as a defense in a criminal prosecution on behalf of hardcore misconduct seems to me to go too far. It diverts attention away
from the real purposes of the first amendment toward the fashioning
of unlikely hypothetical examples as a means of escaping punishment
by one who should be punished.
206.

295 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Wis. 1968).

207. Id., at 990.
208. Id., at 991.
209. Id., at 993.
210. Id., at 990-91.
211.. See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 516-17 (1964).
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Further there is a very narrow gap, and a great danger of
confusion, between the notion of the statute void for overbreadth and
the statute valid on its face, though it might be unconstitutionally
applied. Suppose, for example, that a university has a rule making it
an offense willfully to continue to participate in a demonstration after
a responsible university- official has ordered that the demonstration
stop, on a finding that it is materially and substantially interfering
with the normal activities of the university. Even responsible officials
make mistakes of judgment, and an official might think he saw
interference in a peaceful-and constitutionally protected-demonstration that did not in fact interfere. Of course the participants
in the peaceful demonstration cannot be punished 12 But should
students who refuse to disperse after the dean tells them to stop
trying to set fire to the administration building be able to avoid
discipline under the rule on the ground that the rule is capable of being
applied to the peaceful demonstration, and thus is void for
overbreadth? I would hope not, and would hope that the rule would be
held valid on its face even though, as the Supreme Court said in a
case not dissimilar, "it requires no great feat of imagination to
envisage situations in which such an ordinance might be
unconstitutionally applied. ' 2 1 3 The "overbreadth" concept is seemingly
firmly established in constitutional jurisprudence, but I think it is not
required either by fairness or reasonableness, and I would be hesitant
indeed about importing it to the campus.
Another preliminary procedural issue is the extent to which
university discipline can be applied at all to "off-campus" activity.
Although I use the term "off-campus," I hasten to say that a rigid
on-campus, off-campus dichotomy is hardly workable. The question
cannot meaningfully be posed in property terms, and should be put in
terms of whether any interest of the university community is involved.
Surely there are grounds for university discipline if a student steals the
notes of his classmate from a dormitory room, and the university
interest is no less if he accomplishes the theft while they are on a bus
miles from the campus in search of geology specimens. The student
need not even be engaged in a university-sponsored activity for the
university to have a legitimate interest in the matter. If students at
The University of Texas steal off surreptitiously to capture the Baylor
mascot the night before our annual football game, I think that Texas
212.
213.

Cf. Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d'73 (2d Cir. 1968).
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 91 (1965).
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has a legitimate interest in the matter and is entitled to impose
discipline 4 But it is now widely recognized by educators that the
university has no interest in imposing its own discipline for shoplifting
21 5
from a downtown store or passing a forged check to a merchant.
The Joint Statement, endorsed by so many professional groups, says
that "institutional authority should never be used merely to duplicate
the function of general laws. Only where the institution's interests as
an academic community are distinct and clearly involved should the
special authority of the institution be asserted."' ' 1 Of course, even
conduct wholly divorced from any university connection might show
the student's unfitness to be a member of the academic community
and the risk of injury to persons or property at the university may
require the student to be separated from the university. 217 But even
here, as Dean Robert McKay points out:
[I]t
is hard to conjure up circumstances in which a student with that risk potential
would be left free by the civil authorities. The university should not attempt to
or
second-guess the police and the judicial authorities as to whether a suspected
2 8
convicted wrongdoer can be safely returned to the general community.

All of this may be wise educational policy, but is it the law? In
terms of the decisions of today, the answer would have to be "No."
In the leading Dixon case, 219 it will be recalled, the students had been
expelled for a sit-in at a downtown lunchroom and for mass marches
through the city. The Fifth Circuit insisted that they must have a fair
hearing, but it never suggested that this "off-campus" activity might
not be a proper basis for university discipline. There are other similar
cases,220 although it may fairly be said that there is no indication in
any of them that the point I am here discussing was made to the
court, or that the right to discipline was challenged on the ground
that the activity did not involve any university interest.
Thus, though the case law presently has not restricted the ambit
of university discipline in this fashion, there is no reasoned body of
214. See Linde, supra note 194, at 53-54.
215. Linde, supra note 194, at 50-51. See also McKay, The Student as Private Citizen, 45
DENVER L.J. 558 (1968); Note, Reasonable Rules Reasonably Enforced-Guidelinesfor
University DisciplinaryProceedings, 53 MINN. L. REV. 301, 336-339 (1968).
216. 53 AAUP BULL. 365, 367 (1967).
217. Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1045, 1132 (1968).
218. McKay, supra note 215, at 563.
219. Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961).
220. Knight v. State Board of Education, 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961); Due v.
Florida A and M University, 223 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963); Corvette v. Aldridge, 408
S.W. 2d 935 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
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doctrine on the question. There are straws pointing in the opposite
direction. The district court in Colorado has noted "a trend to reject
the authority of university officials to regulate 'off-campus' activity of
students. '22 1 The General Order in the Western District of Missouri
provides that disciplinary standards "may apply to student behavior
on and off the campus when relevant to any lawful mission, process,
222
or function of the institution."
On this point I do not think that the last word has been said or
that one can predict with much confidence what the last word will be.
Arguments can be made that due process prohibits the university from
enforcing any regulation that is not related to the legitimate business
of the university2" or that punishment by the university for conduct
that does not abuse any privilege extended by the university is so
2 24
I
arbitrary as to be a denial of equal protection of the laws.
recognize the force of these arguments-but I am not yet persuaded
that the courts will accept them.
One final preliminary point is that the procedural safeguards I
will discuss apply only to proceedings against students for
misconduct. They do not apply to purely academic decisions by a
university. Despite the astonishing suggestion of the Harvard Law
Review that even the grade given to a student is subject to judicial
review if it leads to his expulsion,22 5 the courts have considered that
the Dixon case and its progeny apply only where dismissal is "based
upon misconduct, not deficiency in grades. ' 26 The courts will listen
to claims that a dismissal for academic reasons was arbitrary or
capricious, but I know of no case in which relief has been given on
this ground. And in a bizarre case, the courts refused to interfere with
the editorial judgment of the Rutgers Law Review in turning down an
article submitted by Professor Alfred Avins.2 7 These decisions seem to
me entirely right. I realize that I lay myself open to a charge of
221. Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 286 (D. Colo. 1968).
222. 45 F.R.D. at 145.
223. Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom and the Rule-Making Powers of Public
Universities: Sone Constitutional Considerations, 2 LAW IN TRANSITION Q. I, 23 (1965).
224. Id. at 31.
225. Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, supra note 217, at 1139.
226. Mustell v. Rose, 282 Ala. 358, 367, 211 So.2d 489, 498 (1968); See also Wright v.

Texas Southern University, 392 F.2d 728, 729 (5th Cir. 1968); University of Miami v. Militana,
184 So.2d 701 (Fla. App. 1966); Application of Edde, 8 Misc.2d 795, 168 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1957);
Connelly v. University of Vermont, 244 F. Supp. 156 (D. Vt. 1965); Jacobson, The Expulsion of
Students and Due Process of Law, 34 J. OF HIGHER EDUCATION 250, 252 (1963).

227.

Avins v. Rutgers, 385 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1967).
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inconsistency and personal bias: if the dean of students and the
president are subject to being second-guessed by the court on their
administrative decisions, why is the faculty member left undisturbed
when he grades bluebooks or makes similar academic judgments. A
partial answer is that courts are expert in applying the first
amendment and the due process clause, but the persons on campus are
the experts in deciding the academic value of a particular piece of
work. I recognize that when the courts act they do so "not by
authority of our competence but by force of our commissions," ' and
that when duty calls a court cannot shrink from it because of
"modest estimates of our competence in such specialities as public
education. 2 29 But those famous phrases of Justice Jackson were
addressed to a situation in which it was claimed that substantive
constitutional rights were being denied. I perceive no basis on which a
student can claim a constitutional right to a D rather than an F, so
long as the grade given him was the good faith academic judgment of
his instructor.
The point was made at the outset of this chapter that the
requirements of due process are flexible, and different cases will
require different procedural safeguards. Indeed the Dixon case itself
said that "the nature of the hearing should vary depending upon the
circumstances of the particular case. 2 31 Quite informal procedures,
similar to those that usually were followed in all instances prior to
Dixon, should be quite sufficient if the student, fully aware of his
rights, chooses that kind of procedure, 231 or if the possible penalties
are mild.2 32 I suggest that the rules may distinguish in advance
between major offenses and minor offenses and provide different
procedures for each. This issue has not reached the courts directly,
because students do not go to court to challenge mild sanctions. But
the General Order in Missouri calls for particular procedures "in
severe cases of student discipline for alleged misconduct, such as final
expulsion, indefinite or long-term suspension, [or] dismissal with
deferred leave to reapply. ' 2 33 In the Soglin case Judge Doyle
specifically left open the question whether the doctrines of vagueness
228.
Vest Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640 (1943).
229. Id.
230. 294 F.2d at 158.
231. CRIsIs AT COLUMBIA, supra note 193, at 197.
232. Van Alstyne, ProceduralDue Process and State University Students, 10 UCLA L.
REV. 368, 381-383 (1963); Monypenny, University Purpose, Discipline and Due Process, 43
N.D.L. REv. 739, 751 (1967); Joint Statement, 53 AAUP BULL. 365, 368 (1967).
233. 45 F.R.D. at 147.
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and overbreadth would apply to proceedings "in which the range of
possible sanctions is mild, such as the denial of social privileges or a
minor loss of academic credits or perhaps expulsion from a specific
course or perhaps a brief suspension." ' 4 From all of these indications
it seems quite clear that a distinction between major offenses, to
which severe penalties may attach, and minor offenses, calling only
for mild sanctions, is permissible.
One may ask where the cutoff is between a "severe" and a
"mild" penalty. To this there is no clear answer. I am sure that at
The University of Texas we went farther than the Constitution
requires, and indeed farther than I thought wise, in providing that any
loss of privileges, no matter how insignificant, can be imposed only
after the quite formal procedures we require for "major" offenses 35
Professor Van Alstyne at one point was prepared to accept even
suspension for a semester as a mild sanction that did not require a
full hearing 3BIf I read his more recent writings correctly, he now
would draw the line at any suspension. 37 My guess is that the courts
will draw the boundary about where Judge Doyle does, and will
require formal procedures if there is to be expulsion or "suspension
for any significant time."' 5
It is possible, as at the University of Oregon, 239 to classify
offenses as "major" or "minor" in the rules themselves, much as
penal codes commonly divide offenses into felonies and misdemeanors,
according to the gravity of the offense. This may well be desirable,
since it is informative to students and puts them on notice of the
possible consequences of various kinds of misconduct, but it hardly
seems necessary. The alternative is to allow the dean of students, or
whoever it is that initiates disciplinary proceedings, to label any case
he sees fit as a "minor" violation. If he does so, this permits use of
informal procedures but it automatically limits the maximum penalty
that may be assessed.
There is general agreement that four fundamental safeguards are
required in every proceeding that may lead to a serious penalty. The
student must be advised of the grounds of the charge, he must be
234.

Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978, 992 (W.D. Wis. 1968).

235.

THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN,
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11-303 (c) (1968).
236. Van Alstyne, supra note 232, at 386.
237. Van Alstyne, The Student as University Resident, 45 DENVER L.J. 5.82, 593 (1968).
238. Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978, 994 (W.D. Wis. 1968). See also Stricklin v.
Regents of the University of Wisconsin, 297 F. Supp. 416 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
239. Linde, supra note 194, at 67-72.
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informed of the nature of the evidence against him, he must be given

an opportunity to be heard in his own defense, and he must not be
punished except on the basis of substantial evidence. These

requirements are so obvious, and so fundamental, that they require
little elaboration.

No court since Dixon has denied that the student must be given
prior notice of the grounds on which the charge is based 4 Although
only a few years ago 53 per cent of state universities surveyed did not
give a written statement of the charge, 4' such a statement now
appears in the cases that reach court and should be required."' Of
course it need not be drawn with the precision of a criminal
indictment, but should contain "a statement of the specific charges
and grounds which, if proven, would justify" discipline. 43 A student

cannot be punished on the basis of some ground other than that stated
2 "
in the written charge.
The Tennessee Supreme Court recognized 27 years ago that a

student should be advised of the names of at least the principal
witnesses against him and of the nature of their testimony, 4 and it is
now a commonplace that this must be done "in some adequate
manner." 24 Whether a student is entitled to confront the witnesses
against him is a more difficult question. The requirement of Dixon,
that the student must be given "the names of the witnesses against

him and an oral or written report on the facts to which each witness
testifies,'' 24 7 seems the bare minimum that will suffice.
It cannot be doubted that the student has a right to be heard and

to present evidence in his own defense

48

In ascertaining the truth, it is

240. Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1967); Dixon v. Alabama State
Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150, 158 (5th Cir. 1961); Esteban v. Central Missouri State
College, 277 F.Supp. 649, 651 (W.D. Mo. 1967); Schiff v. Hannah, 282 F.Supp. 381, 383 (W.D.
Mich. 1966); Knight v. State Board of Education, 200 F. Supp. 174, 180-81 (M.D. Tenn. 1961);
Woody v. Burns, 188 So.2d 56, 58 (Fla. App. 1966); State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180
Tenn. 99, 109, 171 S.W.2d 822, 826 (1942); General Order on Judicial Standards, supra note
189, at 147.
241. Van Alstyne, supra note 232, at 369.
242. E.g., Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651 (W.D. Mo.
1967).
243. Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150, 158 (5th Cir. 196 1).
244. Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947, 950 (D.S.C. 1967);
Woody v. Burns, 188 So.2d 56, 57 (Fla. App. 1966).
245. State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 109, 171 S.W.2d 822, 826 (1942).
246. Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
See also General Order on JudicialStandards, supra note 189, at 147.
247. Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961). But
cf. Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 813 (2d Cir. 1967).
248. See cases cited in note 240 supra.
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essential "to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the
case against him and opportunity to meet it. Nor has a better way
been found for generating the feeling, so important to a popular
government, that justice has been done. 2 49 One case held that it was
not enough that the dean of men gave students a hearing since he was
only one of a number of persons on the board that recommended their
suspension. The court ordered a new hearing to be conducted before
the president of the college.2° It would ordinarily be inconvenient, and
frequently quite impossible, to require that an evidentiary hearing be
held before the official or group with the ultimate legal authority to
administer discipline. Commonly in our universities that authority is
in the president or the board of regents, and these are busy people
with other things to do. But if, as is usually true, the disciplinary
power is delegated in the first instance to a committee or
administrator, with a right of appeal, the results and findings of the
hearing should be presented to the higher authorities in a report open
to the student's inspection.2 1 The right of the student to be heard in
his own defense may be lost if the student fails to attend at the
appointed time or if he has made it impossible despite diligent effort to
52
give him notice of the hearing
The cases say that no discipline may be imposed except on the
basis of "substantial evidence, ' ' 2 3 and in one recent case a suspension
was set aside because this test had not been met. Students at Lincoln
University were unhappy about the food in the cafeteria. The dean of
students was aware of this and issued a notice saying that he hoped
there would be no demonstration over the issue, but that if there was
one, he hoped it would be orderly, and that university property would
be respected. What seems to have been planned as a peaceful
demonstration soon got out of hand and $1500 damage was done.
The committee that administered discipline apparently proceeded on
the assumption that if a student had helped plan any kind of
demonstration, he could be disciplined. The court ordered that two
suspended students be readmitted, since there was no substantial
249. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171 (1951)
(concurring opinion).
250. Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
251. Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961).
252. Wright v. Texas Southern University, 392 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1968); Barker v.
Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228, 233 (S.D. W.Va. 1968), affirmed, 399 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1968).
See also CRIsIs AT COLUMBIA, supra note 193, at 216-222.
253. Jones v. State Board of Education, 279 F. Supp. 190, 200 (M.D. Tenn. 1968); General
Order on JudicialStandards, supra note 193, at 147.
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evidence to support a finding that those particular students had
planned anything other than a peaceful demonstration or that they
had personally destroyed university property.151
Do these four minimal requirements, now so well established in
the case law, mean that a university may never take immediate action
against those who violate its rules? Is a . state university
constitutionally barred from adopting the policy of a distinguished
private institution that anyone who substitutes force for rational
persuasion and who refuses to desist will be suspended after 15
minutes and expelled after another five minutes? My judgment is that
this particular procedure, if I understand its full implications, is not
available to a state university, but that such a university is not thereby
barred from what Judge Friendly has called "prompt and decisive
5
action."2 1
The problem is a difficult one. There is, on the one hand, no
"constitutional bar to a prompt and severe disciplinary response to
violence and rioting and other constitutionally unprotected
conduct. ' ' 256 At the same time, if the campus is still in an uproar
conditions for holding disciplinary hearings are likely to be far from
ideal. 25 7 Thus I think there must be power in a university, when
circumstances compel it, to suspend students summarily pending a
later hearing at which they will be given all of the ordinary procedural
protections.
Admittedly to act first and hear later is a "drastic procedure"
and imposes on administrators "a heavy responsibility to be exercised
with disinterestedness and restraint." ' 8 I draw an analogy to the
power of courts to impose summary punishment for contempt, a
power to be used only in "those unusual situations

. . .

where instant

action is necessary to protect the . . institution itself.1 59 The Joint
Statement of a number of professional groups allows interim
suspension if necessary for the student's "physical or emotional safety
and well-being, or for reasons relating to the safety and well-being of
students, faculty, or university property.' '260 The cases in point to date
254. Scoggin v. Lincoln University, 291 F. Supp. 161 (W.D. Mo. 1968). See also Wong
v. Hayakawa, No. 50983 (N.D. Cal., April 24, 1969); Zanders v. Louisiana State Board of
Education, 281 F. Supp. 747, 769 (W.D. La. 1968).
255. Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 78 (2d Cir. 1968).
256. Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978, 989 (W.D. Wis. 1968).
257. Scoggin v. Lincoln University, 291 F. Supp. 161, 172 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
258. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 253-254 (1947).
259. Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 167 (1965).
260. 53 AAUP BULL. 365, 368 (1967).
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are not numerous, and do -not fully articulate the considerations
involved, but I think there can be discerned in them a test essentially
that of the Joint Statement. Indeed one court has accepted in terms
the formulation of the Joint Statement as the measure of what the
" ' and other cases permit interim
fourteenth amendment permits,26
2 2
suspension in circumstances consistent with the Joint Statement.
2
2
And it has
Interim suspension presupposes a prompt hearing.
recently been held that a student on request must be given a
preliminary hearing to determine the propriety of his interim
suspension.2 4
We turn now to safeguards beyond the bare minimum that
students have contended they are entitled to as a part of due process.
So far as I can gather, most major universities today permit a student
to be assisted by a lawyer at a disciplinary proceeding if he chooses to
be. Professor Arthur Sherry has said that "his right to counsel,
should the matter appear to him to be of sufficient gravity to make
6 5 It
legal assistance desirable, should receive ungrudging recognition."
may be, however, that those universities that allow representation by
counsel do so as a matter of grace rather than compulsion. Although
there are a few decisions in which a right to counsel has been
recognized,26 6 most decisions are to the contrary. 2 7 If "fairness,
' 28
impartiality and orderliness-in short, the essentials of due process
require, as has recently been held, both the right to counsel and, where
it is needed, to appointed counsel in proceedings for determination of
juvenile delinquency, 2 9 I do not see why they do not require
recognition of similar rights in major disciplinary proceedings. It is
worth noting that a leading case holding that counsel need not be
allowed qualifies this by saying that this is true so long as "the
261. Stricklin v. Regents, 297 F. Supp. 416,420 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
262. Marzette v. McPhee, 294 F. Supp. 562, 568-570 (W.D. Wis. 1968); Scoggin v.
Lincoln University, 291 F. Supp. 161, 172 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
263. Marzette v. McPhee, 294 F. Supp. 562, 569 (W.D. Wis. 1968); Knight v. State Board
of Education, 200 F. Supp. 174, 178 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).

264. Stricklin v. Regents, 297 F. Supp. 416 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
265. Sherry, supra note 192, at 37.
266. Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
Goldwyn v. Allen, 54 Misc.2d 94, 281 N.Y.S.2d 899 (1967).
267. Wasson V. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1967); Barker v. Hardway, 283 F.
Supp. 228, 237 (S.D. W.Va. 1968); Due v. Florida A and M University, 233 F. Supp. 396, 403
(N.D. Fla. 1963); General Order on Judicial Standards, supra note 189, at 147. Cf Madera v.
Board of Education of City of New York, 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967).
268. Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26 (1967).

269. Id. at 34-42.
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government does not proceed through counsel."2 0 Another court has
said that it is desirable that a disciplinary tribunal "have assistance of
legal counsel to guide it in regard to the not uncomplicated problems
which arise in cases where speech is mixed with conduct."'
If
universities follow that wise advice, and provide their own lawyer to
assist a tribunal, in those cases at least the student can hardly be
denied the right to his own counsel, even if, as I doubt, there is no
right to counsel generally in disciplinary proceedings.
In a number of cases students have been allowed to confront the
witnesses against them, and to cross-examine these witnesses,2 2 but
this is ordinarily not a matter of right. In Dixon itself Judge Rives
wrote:
This is not to imply that a full-dress judicial hearing, with the right to crossexamine witnesses, is required. Such a hearing, with the attending publicity and
disturbance of college activities, might be detrimental to the college's educational
3
atmosphere and impractical to carry out.

The reason given is not wholly persuasive. The fear of publicity and

disturbance of college activities seems to presuppose an open hearing,
and that, as will be seen, is in itself a controversial issue. But other
courts have agreed that confrontation need not be permitted as a
matter of right. 27 4 Professor Clark Byse has taken a more
discriminating view, which I find convincing. This is that there is no
right routinely to confrontation, but that confrontation and crossexamination may be required where they are "the conditions of
enlightened action."2 5 Thus in many cases and with regard to many
witnesses the tribunal is free to accept affidavits and to refuse
confrontation. But if the case resolves itself into a problem of
credibility, and the tribunal must choose to believe either the accused
or his accuser, cross-examination is the condition of enlightened
action and is therefore required in the interest of fairness and
reasonableness.
270. Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1967).
271. Scoggin v. Lincoln University, 291 F. Supp. 161, 173 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
272. E.g., Jones v. State Board of Education, 279 F. Supp. 190, 194 (M.D. Tenn. 1968);
Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
273. 294 F.2d at 159.
274. Wong v. Hayakawa, No. 50983 (N.D. Cal., April 24, 1969); State ex rel. Sherman
v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822, 826 (1942); General Order on Judicial Standards, supra
note 189, at 147. See Legislation, College Disciplinary Proceedings. 18 VAND. L. REV. 819,
828-830 (1965). But see Johnson, The Constitutional Rights of College Students, 42 TuxAs
L. REV. 344, 352-353 (1964).
275. Byse, The University and Due Process: A Somewhat Different View, 54 AAUP
BULL. 143, 145 (1968).
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There are scattered and inconclusive decisions holding that the

privilege against self-incirmination

is 276

or is not 7 7 available in

disciplinary proceedings. General statements on this are singularly
unhelpful because they fail to take into account an important
distinction. Some violations of university rules, such as taking over a
campus building, are also violations of criminal statutes. Other
violations of rules, such as cheating, are not. To compel a student to
testify against himself on a charge of the former kind would be to use
the power of the state to extract from him evidence that could be used
against him in a subsequent trial of the criminal charge. Since there is
no other state proceeding in which persons can be compelled to
confess their guilt of a crime,278 there is no reason to think that the
university disciplinary proceeding can be an exception. The privilege
must be recognized in these circumstances 7 9 But the cheating
violation is quite different. The disciplinary proceeding is not itself a
"criminal case" within the meaning of the fifth amendment, and since
cheating is not a crime, there is no other "criminal case" in which the
student's testimony can be used against him. Thus the university may
compel the student's testimony in the cheating case28s if it thinks it is
worth the effort to do so. Since in fact an inference will be drawn
against the student if he chooses not to testify, 28 ' no matter what
protestations are made to the contrary,282 to allow the privilege
generally as a prudential matter has little practical effect and makes it
unnecessary for the tribunal to decide whether particular testimony
might be a link in a chain tending to prove a crime, and thus be
within the constitutional protection. It hardly needs adding that there
is no tenable theory on which the Miranda warnings can be required
23
to be given by a college administrator to a student not in custody. 8
When a student's conduct leads both to a criminal charge and to
disciplinary proceedings within the university-and it was argued
276. State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 109, 171 S.W.2d 822, 826 (1942);
Goldwyn v. Allen, 54 Misc. 2d 94, 99, 281 N.Y.S.2d 899, 906 (1967).
277. Goldberg v. Regents of the University of California, 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 883, 57
Cal. Rptr. 463, 475 (1967); General Order on JudicialStandards,supra note 189, at 147.
278. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967); Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n, Inc.
v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280 (1968).
279. Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia University, 287 F. Supp. 535, 550 (S.D.N.Y.
1968). See also Furutani v. Ewigleben, 297 F. Supp. 1163 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
280. Johnson, supra note 274, at 357.
281. Heyman, Some Thoughts on University Disciplinary Proceedings, 54 CALIF. L. REV.
73, 82-85 (1966).
282. See Wasson v. Trowbridge, 285 F. Supp. 936, 942 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
283. Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 287 (D. Colo. 1968).
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earlier in this section that it may properly do so only if some genuine
university interest has been harmed by the criminal act-claims of
"double jeopardy" are not uncommon, but are utterly without
merit."' Nor can the university be required to postpone its
disciplinary proceeding until the criminal charge is disposed of.2 The
only circumstance in which a double jeopardy argument might have
merit on the campus scene would be if a disciplinary tribunal has
absolved a student on a charge and the university, finding new and
stronger evidence, should bring the same charge again. This would
raise very serious questions of fairness and reasonableness, but
fortunately the problem seems never to have arisen.
A number of commentators have thought that the rules about
search and seizure limit university discipline, even with regard to a
dormitory room.8 6 The decision to the contrary by Judge Johnson in
Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of Troy State University,2 8 has
been criticized as relegating students to "second-class citizenship.""28 I
have taken a different view, and have written elsewhere of Moore that
"the result, if unappealing, is sound."2 9
Moore was suspended from Troy State, after a proper hearing,
for having marijuana in his room. The dean of men had been called
to the office of the chief of police and given a list of names of
students whose rooms narcotics agents, on the basis of information
from unnamed but reliable informers, wished to search. Some of the
suspected students were packing to leave the campus for vacation,
and it was decided to search the rooms immediately. The agents,
accompanied by the dean, searched Moore's room, without a warrant.
Moore was present but did not consent to the search. I note first that
the Moore decision, holding that the marijuana found in the room
was properly admitted at the disciplinary hearing, does not allow
random fishing expeditions into student's rooms and belongings.
Although Judge Johnson did not require that the "probable cause"
284. McKay, supra note 215, at 564; General Order on Judicial Standards, supra note
189. at 147-148.
285. Furutani v. Ewigleben, 297 F. Supp. 1163 (N.D. Cal. 1969); Grossner v, Trustees
of Columbia University, 287 F. Supp. 535, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), Goldberg v. Regents of the
University of California, 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 885, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463, 476 (1967).
REV. 223, 231-233 (1969); 54 IowA L. REV. 618 (1969).
286. Van Alstyne, supra note 237, at 588-589; Johnson, supra note 274, at 353-356.
287. 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
288. Note, Reasonable Rules Reasonably EnJbrced. supra note 215, at 324-325; 3 GA. L.
Riv. 223. 231-233 (1969).
289. 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL 36 (1969).
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test of the fourth amendment be met, he did say that a search is
proper only if there is "a reasonable belief on the part of the college
authorities that a student is using a dormitory room for a purpose
which is illegal or which would otherwise seriously interfere with
campus discipline."2 0 Second, the college involved in Moore had a
rule clearly reserving the right to enter rooms for inspection purposes
and to search student belongings. Thus the student could not have
regarded his room as a place "in which there was a reasonable
expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion, ' 2
and this,
soundly in my judgment, has been regarded by the Supreme Court in
recent cases as the measure of fourth amendment protection.
You will recall that I described the result in Moore as
"unappealing" even though I thought it sound. This is an appropriate
place to say again that the Constitution provides minimal protections
and that prudential judgment may suggest that a university go far
beyond what the Constitution requires. The committee drafting rules
for The University of Texas had concluded, on an analysis similar to
that I have made here, that the university did have a power of search.
For several days the committee struggled for appropriate language
with which to codify this power. Then a member of the committee
happened to ask the dean of students under what circumstances the
university had exercised this power. The dean replied that so far as he
knew it never had. Since the university had not felt the need to resort
to searches in the past, we saw no reason to allow it to search in the
2 2
future, and a rule was adoptel that denies it any such power. 1
The issue of an open hearing is an interesting one. One of the
grievances at Columbia in the spring of 1968 was the refusal to have
open hearings in disciplinary proceedings, and the Cox Commission
was critical of the institution for refusing "a public hearing altogether
for an offense alleged to have been committed in public, where no one's
privacy or reputation can be affected. 2 19 3 At the University of
Oregon, on the other hand, the rulemakers specifically rejected student
suggestions that hearings should be closed unless the accused student
requested otherwise, and provided that proceedings are always open
unless otherwise ordered. 294 It seems quite clear that fairness and
290.
291.

284 F.Supp. at 730.
Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968).

292.

THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN,

293.
294.

INSTITUTIONAL REGULATIONS ON STUDENT

11-301(f) (1968).
CRISIS AT COLUMBIA, supra note 193, at 97.
Linde, supra note.194, at 57.
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reasonableness do not require that a disciplinary proceeding be open,
and the cases so hold.295 Indeed one of the cases not only rejects a
constitutional right to an open hearing, but says that it is "more
fitting" to have a private hearing!"6 Another judge suggested that it
may be desirable to allow the press to be present.297 It might also be
wise to allow the accused student to have a few relatives or friends, or
to permit responsible faculty members and student leaders to be
present to guard against any later claim that the student was not
fairly treated.298 A truly open hearing does have the danger that
concerned Judge Rives in the Dixon case, that it may lead to
"publicity and disturbance of college activities" and thus "be
detrimental to the college's educational atmosphere." ' It is hard to
imagine many students accused of cheating or breaking parietal rules
who would wish an open hearing. The demand for this kind of
hearing is likely to come from those who want the hearing to "supply
a forum for the politicalization of cases. ' '3"" Nothing in the
Constitution of the United States requires a university to allow its
disciplinary procedures to be utilized for such a purpose.
No one doubts that a student charged with misconduct has a
right to an impartial tribunalY l There is doubt as to what this means.
It would be wholly impractical in many educational institutions to
provide that no one who has prior knowledge of or contact with the
case may sit on the tribunal. We do not ask this much even of jurors
in a criminal case and thus it is not demanded of a university 0 There
is weighty authority for the proposition that members of the tribunal
may also be witnesses against the accused student, since the "limited
combination by a school administrative body of prosecutorial and
adjudicatory functions is not fundamentally unfair in the absence of a
295.
731 (M.D.
(W.D. La.
296.
1968).
297.
731 (M.D.
298.

Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of Troy State University, 284 F. Supp. 725,
Ala. 1968); Zanders v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 281 F. Supp. 747, 768
1968); General Order on JudicialStandards, supra note 189, at 147.
Zanders v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 281 F. Supp. 747, 768 (W.D. La.
Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of Troy State University, 284 F. Supp. 725,
Ala. 1968).
THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN, INSTITUTIONAL

SERVICES AND CONDUCT §

REGULATIONS ON STUDENT

11-406(a) (1968).

299. 294 F.2d at 159.
300. Hall, Movement Legal Services Aids Unpopular Dejendants, TEXAS LAW FORUNIh
March 6, 1969, p.3, col.2.
301. Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 813 (2d Cir. 1967); Esteban v. Central
Missouri State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
302. Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967).
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showing of other circumstances, such as malice or personal interest in
the outcome of a case. 3 3 I agree that this procedure may not be
fundamentally unfair, but I wonder if it does not fall by the other test
of reasonableness? When other alternatives are so easy, it seems quite
unreasonable for the judge also to be a witness, a role "manifestly
inconsistent with the attitude of impartiality which he is sworn to
maintain.""3 4 At Oshkosh State University, for example, the president
ordinarily considers appeals and makes recommendations to the
regents. But when the president was personally involved, since the
charges grew out of an incident in which students broke into his
office, threatened him, and held him prisoner, the regents excused the
president from participation and engaged a respected former justice of
the state supreme court to conduct the hearings and make
recommendations.3 0 5 I do not doubt that the president of that
institution could and would have put his personal feelings aside and
acted without malice or personal interest, but it was far more
reasonable to excuse him and to provide a procedure that not only
ensures that justice is done but also that it will seem to have been
done.
Professor Van Alstyne has suggested the possibility of an equal
protection issue if punishment indiscriminately threatened by a rule
properly forbidding certain conduct is unduly harsh and not essential
to the university's interest.30 This view has attracted no judicial
following. The usual rule, and, I think, the constitutionally proper
rule, is that if the student has been found guilty of violation of a valid
rule after a hearing that meets the tests of fairness and reasonableness,
the punishment given him is a matter that should be left to the
discretion of the university 0 7 Nor is there any requirement that all
those guilty of similar violations must be treated alike. Leaders of a
disruptive movement may be dealt with more severely than their
followers,3 ° and freshmen may be dealt with more gently than
graduate students 0 9
I have now examined the most prominent issues of procedural
due process that have come to the surface in the wake of Dixon.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
1968).
309.

Jones v. State Board of Education, 279 F. Supp. 190, 200 (M.D. Tenn. 1968).
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 147 (1954).
Marzette v. McPhee, 294 F. Supp. 562, 566 (W.D. Wis. 1968).
Van Alstyne, supra note 223, at 32.
Corvette v. Aldridge, 408 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. Civ. App. (1966).
Zanders v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 281 F. Supp. 747, 766 (W.D. La.
Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 287 (D. Colo. 1968).
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Doubtless the future will uncover more. Is there any right to discovery
in disciplinary proceedings? Do students charged with participation in
a common violation have a right to be tried jointly? Or a right to be
tried separately? Can administrative officials increase the penalty
assessed by the tribunal? These, and many others, can be imagined. I
am hopeful that the analysis I have suggested here will provide a
method of approach to new questions. I have no doubt that the courts
will reach right results if they do not allow themselves to be distracted
by analogies from criminal law or administrative law or elsewhere and
keep their gaze fastened on the twin requirements of fairness and
reasonableness as these apply in that unique institution, the academic
community.
IV.

CAN THE CAMPUS AFFORD THE CONSTITUTION?

The three preceding sections have been descriptive in nature, an
examination of the process by which the Constitution came to the
campus and the meaning it has in this new setting. I cannot conclude
without a brief evaluation of this development, an attempt to weigh
the benefits of the new dispensation against its costs, for costs it
surely has.
In 1967 President James A. Perkins of Cornell University,
addressing the New England Association of Colleges and Secondary
Schools, took as his topic "The University and Due Process. ' ' 310
President Perkins voiced a generally gloomy view of the notion that
"judicial processes can be substituted for academic processes, ' 31 ' and
expressed fear that the result might be "interference with the capacity
of the university to function as a self-contained community. 3 2
Professor Clark Byse, of the Harvard Law School, in his presidential
address to the American Association of University Professors,
undertook a detailed answer to President Perkins 1 3
I do not propose to retrace the ground covered by President
Perkins and Professor Byse, and refer to their exchange of views only
as indicating that it is not a self-evident proposition that the
developments of the last eight years have been desirable ones.
310.
(1968).
311.
312.
313.
BULL. 143

Perkins, The University and Due Process, 62 AMER. LIBRARY ASSN,

BULL. 977

Id.
Id. at 979.
Byse, The University and Due Process: A Somewhat Different View, 54 AAUP
(1968).
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Professor Hans Linde has observed that "the legalism of student
rights in the public-service model of the state university has its costs.
It accelerates, just as it reflects, the erosion of traditional and valued
forms of the academic community. . . . But legalism is an inevitable
price of mass operation."3 14
One obvious cost is in the time and money required to administer
a discipline system that meets constitutional standards. If the full
panoply of due process were to be invoked on behalf of every student
charged with drinking beer on the intramural field, the institution
itself would be brought to a halt. Students, faculty, and
administrators would all be so busy at disciplinary hearings that we
should have to suspend classes and abandon research. President
Perkins is surely right when he tells us that "there are human rights
involved in the time and cost of adjudication." 315 Fortunately such a
situation is an imaginary horrible. The distinction suggested in section
III between major offenses and minor offenses provides much of the
answer. At even the largest institution, the cases of alleged misconduct
in which an administrator would think that suspension or expulsion
was a conceivable penalty must be very few indeed. Even in those few
cases most students are going to be content with administrative
disposition of the charge. There are statistics indicating that fewer
than 10% of students charged with misconduct deny the facts or take
exception to the discipline administratively imposed I At my own
institution, The University of Texas, where more than 30,000 students
are enrolled, there were 544 cases from September 1968 through
March 1969 in which the dean of students, as a result of preliminary
investigation, brought disciplinary charges. Of these 531 were "minor
offenses," even under the very restrictive definition of this category
that we have at Texas, and only thirteen were "major offenses," in
which the dean considered that some withdrawal of privileges might
conceivably be justified. In eight of the thirteen cases of major offenses,
the student waived hearing and consented to administrative disposition
of the case. Thus there were only five cases out of 544, or fewer than one
per cent, in which a hearing before a disciplinary tribunal was held.
The procedures constitutionally required are likely to be
demanded in only two kinds of cases: charges of cheating or similar
314.
(1966)..
315.
316.
REV.

Linde, Campus Law: Berkeley Viewed From Eugene, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 40, 65
Perkins, supra note 310, at 981.
Van Alstyne, Procedural Due Process and State University Students, 10 UCLA L.

368, 371 (1963).
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serious misconduct in which the facts are disputed, and charges
arising out of demonstrations or other activity of a political nature. It
will cost time and money to do what due process demands in these
classes of cases, but it will be time and money well spent. In the first
kind of case the university ought gladly incur any cost to be sure that
it is not committing a serious injustice, likely to damage the student
for life, by finding him guilty of an offense he did not in fact commit.
In the second kind of case the time and money are well spent in
providing assurance both to the persons charged and to the remainder
of the academic community that sanctions have been imposed fairly
and responsibly.
A different kind of cost comes from loss of support for the
university. One would have to be wholly blind to what is happening in
America today not to know that the taxpayers, and their
representatives in the legislatures, are outraged by events on campus
and think that universities have been far too permissive. It is
politically popular to refuse to allow Mark Rudd to speak on campus
or to deny recognition to the S DS or to expel on the spot militant
demonstrators. And yet here is the Constitution, which says that none
of these things can be done. Thus the university is barred from doing
what those who provide its financial support insist that it must do.
The loss of legislative support for the state university is a very
frightening prospect-and a very real one. I have no doubt that many
public institutions are going to have to tighten their belts for the next
few years and operate on budgets that will not provide for their needs
or permit them to exploit their opportunities. It is a very grim
prospect. But there is no law of nature that says that faculty members
must have salary increases every year and though it would be nice to
have a third-generation computer immediately, we can make do for a
time with what we have.
This kind of crisis in relations between the university and the
legislature is not unprecedented. Much of the same kind of tension
developed during the days of McCarthyism in the early 50's. Most
universities behaved quite courageously in the face of great public
pressure and refused to sacrifice academic freedom for the sake of the
next appropriation bill. Those universities paid a price for their
courage, but they managed to survive. Passions cool off, and
reasonable legislators come to see that when they short-change the
university because of some development on campus they do not like,
the ultimate harm is to the young men and women of the state, and to
the state itself. I would hope that great universities would insist on the
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principles of freedom of speech and fairness in procedure on their
campuses whatever the cost in financial support. The fact that the
Constitution is now directly applicable to them, and that the courts
are not going to permit them any choice in the matter, merely insures
that what ought to be done will be done.
There are those who think that the student was better off when he
had no procedural protections, and the dean was "a friend to the
student ' 3 1 7 rather than his prosecutor.
The administrators of student affairs, who have the immediate responsibility for
the operation of formal and informal controls on student conduct do not readily
separate their functions of advice, guidance, and assistance, on the one hand and
formal discipline, or punishment on the other. They tend to see formal
punishment, where imposed, as only a continuation of the guidance and
counseling function, as Clausewitz saw war as a continuation of diplomacy ...
To persons with this orientation toward the control of student conduct, the
formalities of due process are not only irrelevant, they are destructive of the

mutuality on which counseling rests Is
I do not want to seem to disparage this view. In the course of drafting
rules on student services and conduct for my university, I had
constant and close contact with those persons at Texas who work in
the area of student life. I was impressed by the dedication,
sensitivity, and compassion that every one of them brought to his
work. There is every reason to suppose that this is true around the
country, and that these administrators do "exercise their authority
benignly." 319 For these reasons I agree with the Cox Commission that
"the older paternalistic procedures probably gave much greater
protection to most student offenders," 32 0 and that "in most cases, the
student offender may fare much better under quasi-parental forms of
correction than under a quasi-judicial procedure." 321
But mark well, the Cox Commission speaks of "most student
offenders" and "most cases." A quiet interview with a kindly dean is
doubtless much better than a formal adversary proceeding for the
freshman girl, unversed in the niceties of attribution of sources, who is
technically guilty of plagiarism on a term paper. It seems to me
317.
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unlikely that counseling and understanding will be productive with the
student who has publicly threatened to "eliminate" the president and
"tear this joint down. 32 2 The older paternalistic procedures are illadapted to deal with those whose complaint is that the university is
too paternalistic.
Even on the simpler and traditional kinds of misconduct, the
quasi-paternal procedures were best only in "most cases." Wellmeaning and devoted administrators did make mistakes. President
Perkins tells us that "arbitrariness is not unknown in the most elite
intellectual circles. Administrators are not uniformly capable of
distinguishing between what they consider desirable and what is
acceptable to a consensus of the community. Operating under
pressure, as administrators do much of the time, they can be
3 23
insensitive to the most rudimentary forms of justice and fair play.
It is because I agree with the Cox Commission that the older
procedures were better for the students in "most cases," and because
I think also that there was some cases for which they were ill-adapted
or in which they did not work properly, that I have proposed in
section III that the student should have a choice, and in serious cases
should be able to have his case disposed of administratively, rather
than by a full hearing, if he prefers to do so.
It is my judgment, on balance, that the application of
constitutional principles to universities has its costs, but these are
tolerable costs if they are viewed without exaggeration. The costs are
considerably outweighed by the benefits. Constitution or no, it is
hardly thinkable that we could deny to today's generation of students
freedom of expression or procedural fairness. The dramatic reversal of
doctrine that I described in section I shows "that the courts . . . are
ready to vindicate claims for justice rooted in constitutional
principle ' 32 4 and blunts the argument of those who defend the use of
coercive power on the ground that it is often the only effective means
2
of bringing about institutional change 1
It is a pleasant exercise in nostalgia to reminisce about how
simple life was in the good old days, but we exist in the present. The
distinguished president of the American Council on Education, Dr.
Logan Wilson, has said:
322. See Jones v. State Board of Education, 279 F. Supp. 190, 201 (M.D. Tenn. 1968),
affirmed, 407 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1969).
323. Perkins, supra note 310, at 980.
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An Ivy League president noted some years ago that the fewer rules and
regulations a college or university has for its students, the better. This
observation may have been valid for most places then, and for some places now,
but I suspect that many of our institutions must face up to the need for more
formalization than they once required. This implies a codification of roles, with
more specification of behavior norms, and set procedures for their enforcement.21

Some persons welcome this development, as I do. Others do not. But
it is here, it is a fact of life, and our educational institutions had
better accustom themselves to it.
It is far preferable that institutions accept the Constitution on
their own initiative rather than wait until it is forced upon them by a
court. Clark Byse is surely right in arguing that the values important
to an academic community will be "realized more effectively and fully
in an institution peopled by administrators, faculty, and students of
honor and rectitude than in a lesser institution in which those values
are grudgingly accepted because of a judicial decree. ' 32 7 Needed
changes to meet constitutional criteria can, of course, be made by
administrative or regential fiat, but to do so is to overlook the
obvious opportunity that this task presents to deepen the sense that
there is an academic community, of which students, faculty,
administrators, and regents are all part, by permitting all of the
elements in the community to participate in the process. I think that
the courts have not entered this field willingly or cheerfully. They have
been forced to do so, and to draft rules on an ad hoc, case by case,
basis, because many universities have failed to put their own houses in
order and have left the matter by default to the courts.328
A court decision that a university rule or procedure is
unconstitutional is an unhappy event, which can only deepen distrust
within the academic community. Voluntary acceptance of wise rules,
going in many instances beyond the minimal requirements of the
Constitution, is a constructive act, "calculated to ensure the confidence
of all concerned with student discipline.13 29
These are unhappy times for those persons who are charged with
the governance of great universities. 30 They are required to make
326.
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328.
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329. General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review of
Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D. 133, 148

(W.D. Mo. 1968).
330. See Presidents Cite Strains of Job As Many Quit,
EDUCATION, April 21, 1969, p. I, col.3.

CHRONICLE OF HIGHER

1088

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 22

agonizingly hard decisions on matters that may involve even the
survival of the university as a free institution dedicated to a high
purpose. In making these decisions, the administrator will not long
preserve his sanity if he must constantly look over his right shoulder
to see what the legislature will think, and then over his left shoulder
to determine how the militant students will react. The long-term
interests of the university require that it do what is right, regardless of
what immediate consequences may be feared. In forming that
judgment, the administrator now has a valuable guide in the
Constitution of the United States.

